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Over the past twenty (20) years the South African jurisprudence has been shaped by 
numerous factors that emanate primarily from the interpretation of the Constitution. As a 
result the study, knowledge and philosophy of law has witnessed vital developments which at 
some point seem to cause confusions in the legal fraternity. Among other confusions that 
exist is what constitutes “rationality” in law, what factors are relevant in defining rationality, 
how has rationality been defined and how has it been applied?  
 
The thesis explores various instances where our courts particularly the Constitutional Courts 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal has defined and applied the rationality test when testing for 
the exercise of public power by the public functionaries. To begin with, our courts have held 
that rationality is a central principle under the principle of legality which is an implicit term 
to the study of the rule of law. The rule of law itself has been held to be an implicit term to 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and that all actions will only be valid if they 
comply with the rule of law as a constitutional value thereof.  
 
However this is not to imply that other values of the constitution like transparency, openness 
and accountability are less important than the rule of law but most litigation has occurred 
under rule of law, hence why the focus of this thesis is on the rule of law. Under this legality 
principle, there are a lot of principles like the principle of authority but rationality appears to 
be the most significant and the courts have focused mostly on it.  
 
In defining what legality rationality is, our courts have pronounced that it is a legal safety-net 
applicable to every exercise of public power but more particularly where no constitutionally 
defined right has been violated, it protects individuals against the abuse of power. The courts 
initially envisaged a ‘poor rationality”, however when comparing how the principle has 
developed over years it is clear that the principle has been used variably. At some point 
rationality has been applied leniently while at some point more stringently without any clear 
guidance, which creates uncertainty as to the correct legal position.  
 
Among other considerations of the thesis includes the fact that when the rationality principle 
is stringently applied, it has been held to threaten the principle of the separation of powers, 
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however when the same principle is leniently applied, it has been held to fall short of the 
required standards and the demands of the constitutions especially the transparent basis of the 
decisions. And when this principle is applied variably, it has been seen to undermine the very 
principle of the rule of law that it is meant to give effect to; this is because the rule of law 
demands that law should be static and predictable. This confusion stimulates the construction 
of the thesis as different developments have been formulated but most interestingly proposes 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background 
Section 1 of the Constitution1 provides that the Republic of South Africa is “one, sovereign, 
democratic state” that is founded, inter alia, on the values of the “supremacy of the Constitution 
and the rule of law”.2 Apart from the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, section 
1 further provides that the Republic is also founded on the value of a “multi-party system of 
democratic government to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness”.3  
 
In its controversial judgment in United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of 
South Africa,4 the Constitutional Court held that these values are significant for two reasons: 
first, because they influence the interpretation of the other provisions of the Constitution and 
ordinary rules of law; and, second, because they set positive standards with which ordinary 
rules of law and conduct must comply in order to be valid. An important consequence of this 
latter function is that law or conduct which is in conflict with the values listed in Section 1 can 
be declared invalid and struck down.5  
 
2. The principle of the rule of law 
Out of all of the values set out in Section 1, the principle of the rule of law has arguably attracted 
the most judicial attention and, accordingly, has played a critical role in the development of 
South Africa’s system of constitutional review. The Constitutional Court itself has referred to 
and discussed the principle of the rule of law in at least 30 different judgments.  
 
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the principle of the rule of law can be traced back 
to its judgment in Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council.6  
 
The facts of this case are as follows. In 1996 the Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council and its substructures passed resolutions adopting a new uniform rate of 
                                                          
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 Section 1(c). 
3 Section 1(d). 
4 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC). 
5 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC) para 19. 




6.45 cents in the Rand on all land under their jurisdiction for the financial year ahead.7 One of 
the consequences of adopting this new uniform rate was that the rates payable by some 
ratepayers, such as the appellants, went up, while the rates payable by others went down.  
 
After the resolutions were passed, the appellants applied to the Johannesburg High Court for 
an order declaring them to be unconstitutional and invalid. They based their application on the 
grounds that the resolutions fell outside the powers of the respondents and thus infringed the 
“principle of authority” which forms a part of the constitutional right to just administrative 
action guaranteed in section 24(a) of the interim Constitution.8  
 
The Johannesburg High Court dismissed the application and the appellants then appealed 
unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court of Appeal and then to the Constitutional Court. Like the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court also dismissed the application and found 
in favour of the respondents. 
 
In arriving at this decision, the Constitutional Court began by pointing out that the first issue it 
had to decide was whether the resolutions passed by the respondents imposing a new uniform 
rate could be classified as administrative action. This is because the right to just administrative 
action applies only to those exercises of public power that can be properly classified as 
administrative action.  
 
Insofar as this issues was concerned, the Constitutional Court held that the resolutions passed 
by the respondents could not be classified as administrative action. Instead, it had to be 
classified as legislative action. This is because, under the interim Constitution, the legal status 
of municipal councils had changed from being administrative bodies to legislative bodies 
whose members were directly elected and whose decisions were based on political 
considerations.9 
 
Despite the fact that the resolutions could not be tested against the right to just administrative 
action, the Constitutional Court held further, this did not mean that they could not be reviewed 
                                                          
7 The four substructures were the the Eastern Metropolitan Substructure, the Northern Metropolitan 
Substructure, the Western Metropolitan Substructure and the Southern Metropolitan Substructure. 
8 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 




at all. Instead of being tested against the right to just administrative action, they would have to 
be tested against the principle of legality which applies to legislative action and which, like the 
right to just administrative action, also encompasses the “principle of authority”.10 
 
“These provisions imply that a local government may only act within the powers lawfully conferred upon it. There 
is nothing startling in this proposition, it is a fundamental principle of the rule of law, recognised widely, that the 
exercise of public power is only legitimate where lawful. The rule of law to the extent at least that it expresses 
this principle of legality is generally understood to be a fundamental principle of constitutional law”.11 
 
It follows from this finding, the Constitutional Court went on to hold, that while every exercise 
of public power is subject to the principle of authority, the source of this principle differs 
depending upon the nature of the power in question. In the case of administrative action, the 
principle of authority is encompassed in the right to just administrative action. In the case of 
legislative and executive action, the principle of authority is encompassed in the principle of 
legality which forms a part of the rule of law.12 
 
Apart from the Fedsure Life Insurance case, the Constitutional Court has discussed the 
principle of legality on a number of other occasions. In these cases it has held that the principle 
of legality imposes a number of other restrictions on the exercise of legislative power. Among 
these are the following:  
 
(a)  First, the legislature may not pass legislation that applies retrospectively or that targets 
a particular individual or a particular group.13 
 
(b)  Second, the legislature may not pass legislation that is arbitrary or capricious or 
irrational.14 
 
(c)  Third, the legislature may not pass legislation that is so vague and uncertain that those 
who are bound by it do not know what is expected of them.15  
                                                          
10 Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at para 58. 
11 Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at para 56. 
12 Section 1(c). 
13 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
14 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) and Merafong 
Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC). 
15 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) para 108. See also Dawood v Minister 





Besides imposing additional restrictions on the exercise of legislative powers, the 
Constitutional Court has held that the principle of legality also imposes similar restrictions on 
the exercise of executive power. Among these are the following: 
 
(a)  First, the executive must exercise its powers to serve the legitimate purpose of those 
powers: it must not act arbitrarily, and for no purpose or with an ulterior motive.16 
 
(b)  Second, the executive may not exercise the powers that have been conferred upon it in 
a manner that is irrational.17 
 
(c)  Third, the executive may not exercise the powers that have been conferred upon it in 
bad faith or misconstrue its powers.18 
 
(d)  Fourth, the executive must exercise its powers diligently and without undue delay.19 
 
(e)  Last, when the executive exercises its powers it may not ignore relevant 
considerations20 and it must act with procedural rationality.21 
 
3. The test for rationality 
In the same way that the principle of the rule of law has attracted the most judicial attention 
out of all of the values listed in Section 1, the test for rationality has attracted the most judicial 
attention out of all of the components of the principle of legality. Like the principle of the rule 
of law, therefore, the test for rationality has also played a critical role in the development of 
South Africa’s system of constitutional review. 
                                                          
principle of legality and the right to procedural fairness: A critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal (2016) at 5.  
16 Gauteng Gambling Board & another v MEC for Economic Development, Gauteng Provincial Government 
2012 (5) SA 24 (SCA). 
17 Pharmaceutical Manufactures: In re Ex parte Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) and Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the RSA 2010 6 BCLR 520 (CC). 
18 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
19 Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development v Chonco 2010 (4) SA 82 (CC). 
20 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
21 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC). These 
examples are taken from G Manyika The rule of law, the principle of legality and the right to procedural 
fairness: A critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court Unpublished LLM Thesis, 





The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the test for rationality can be traced back to its 
judgment in Prinsloo v Van der Linde.22  
 
In this case the applicant applied for an order declaring section 84 of the Forest Act23 to be 
unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it infringed the right to equality before the law 
guaranteed in section 8(1) of the interim Constitution. Section 84 of the Forest Act 
differentiated between owners of land located inside designated fire control areas and owners 
of land located outside designated fire control area. Owners of land located outside designated 
fire control areas were presumed to be negligent when a fire started on their land, while owners 
of land located inside such areas were not. 
 
A majority of the Constitutional Court rejected the application and found that the differentiation 
did not infringe section 8(1). In arriving at this decision, the majority held that a differentiation 
which does not amount to unfair discrimination (i.e. a mere differentiation) will only infringe 
section 8(1) if there is no rational relationship between the differentiation and a legitimate 
governmental purpose. This is because when it comes to a mere differentiation “the 
constitutional state is expected to act in a rational manner. It should not regulate in an arbitrary 
manner or manifest ‘naked preferences’ that serve no legitimate purpose, . . ”.24 
 
After setting out these principles, the majority turned to apply them to the facts. In this respect 
the majority found that the differentiation was rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose, namely reducing the risk of fires spreading from land located outside a designated fire 
control area. The differentiation was rationally related to this purpose because it encouraged 
owners of land located outside designated fire control areas (who were not required to take any 
fire prevention measure by the statute itself) to be more vigilant about preventing fires.25  
 
Following this judgment, the Constitutional Court dramatically extended the application of the 
test for rationality when it used the test, initially, to determine the constitutional validity of 
legislative action in New National Party v Government or the RSA26 and, later, to determine 
                                                          
22 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC). 
23 122 of 1984. 
24 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at paras 25-26. 
25 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at paras 39-40. 




the constitutional validity of executive action in Pharmaceutical Manufactures: In re the Ex 
parte Application of the President.27 
 
In the New National Party case the applicant applied for an order declaring sections 1(xii) and 
6(2) read together with section 38(2) of the Electoral Act to be invalid on the grounds that they 
infringed the right to vote guaranteed in section 19 of the Constitution. These sections of the 
Electoral Act provided that a citizen could register to vote and thus vote only if he or she was 
in possession of a bar-coded identity document (“ID”). 
 
A majority of the Constitutional Court rejected the application and found that the bar-coded ID 
requirement did not infringe section 19 and neither did it infringe the principle of legality. In 
arriving at this decision the majority held that not only must legislation which merely 
differentiates be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, but so must all 
legislative schemes and that Parliament cannot “act arbitrarily or capriciously”. 
 
“It is to be emphasised that it is for Parliament to determine the means by which voters must identify themselves.  
This is not the function of a court.  But this does not mean that Parliament is at large in determining the way in 
which the electoral scheme is to be structured.  There are important safeguards aimed at ensuring appropriate 
protection for citizens who desire to exercise this foundational right.  The first of the constitutional constraints 
placed upon Parliament is that there must be a rational relationship between the scheme which it adopts and the 
achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose.  Parliament cannot act capriciously or arbitrarily.  The absence 
of such a rational connection will result in the measure being unconstitutional.  An objector who challenges the 
electoral scheme on these grounds bears the onus of establishing the absence of a legitimate government purpose, 
or the absence of a rational relationship between the measure and that purpose”.28  
 
After setting out these principles the majority turned to apply them to the facts. In this respect 
the majority found that the bar-coded ID requirement was rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose, namely the effective, efficient and reliable exercise of the right to vote. 
The bar-coded ID was rationally related to this purpose because it was administratively 
efficient, it reduced the possibility of electoral fraud and it did not indicate the race of its 
bearer.29 
 
                                                          
27 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
28 New National Party v Government of the RSA 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) at para 19. 




In the Pharamceutical Manufacturers case the President applied for an order declaring his 
decision to bring the Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act (the 
“Medicines Act”) prematurely into operation to be invalid on the grounds that his decision fell 
outside the powers conferred upon him by the Act and thus infringed the “principle of 
authority” which is encompassed by the common law right to just administrative action.  
 
The Constitutional Court granted the application not on the grounds that the President’s 
decision fell outside his authority and thus infringed the right to just administrative action, but 
rather on the grounds that the President’s decision was irrational and thus infringed the 
principle of legality. In arriving at this decision, the Court held that the test for rationality 
essentially provides that the exercise of public power by the executive and other functionaries 
should not be arbitrary.  
 
“It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the executive and other functionaries 
should not be arbitrary.  Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, 
otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement.  It follows that in order to pass 
constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public power by the executive and other functionaries must, at least, comply 
with this requirement.  If it does not, it falls short of the standards demanded by our Constitution for such action.”30 
 
In addition, the Constitutional Court also held, the question whether a decision is rationally 
related to the purpose for which the power was given calls for an objective enquiry. “Otherwise 
a decision that, viewed objectively, is in fact irrational, might pass muster simply because the 
person who took it mistakenly and in good faith believed it to be rational. Such a conclusion 
would place form above substance, and undermine an important constitutional principle”.31 
 
After setting out these principles, the Constitutional Court then turned to apply them to the 
facts of the case and came to the conclusion that the President’s decision to bring the Medicines 
Act into operation was irrational. This is because the machinery required to implement the Act 
was not yet in place and the President’s decision rendered the Act inoperable. It also created a 
dangerous lacunae in the law.32 
                                                          
30 Pharmaceutical Manufactures: In re Ex parte Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 85. 
31 Pharmaceutical Manufactures: In re Ex parte Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 86. 
32 Pharmaceutical Manufactures: In re Ex parte Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 





4. The development of the test for rationality  
As Hoexter has pointed out, following the judgment in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case 
it appeared as though the test for rationality would be applied only on very rare occasions for 
the following two reasons: 
 First, because the principle of legality itself is merely a residual ground of review and, 
accordingly, that it should be used only in very limited circumstances, namely when no 
other ground of review is applicable. 
 Second, because, as it was defined and described by the Constitutional Court in the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, the test for rationality is a minimum threshold 
requirement for the exercise of public power.33 
 
The low level nature of the test for rationality was expressly confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court in Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport34 where it rejected an invitation 
to go beyond “the rational connection test between means and ends” and embrace a much wider 
standard of review, one which not only asks “whether the impugned legislative measure 
discriminates unfairly, but also whether it ‘unfairly deprive[s] people of constitutional 
protection’”.35 
 
In arriving at this decision, the Constitutional Court expressly stated that “the requirement of 
rationality is not directed at testing whether legislation is fair or reasonable or appropriate. Nor 
is it aimed at deciding whether there are other or even better means that could have been used”. 
Instead, it is simply a threshold requirement and as such is restricted to asking “whether the 
measure the lawgiver has chosen is properly related to the public good it seeks to realise” and 
nothing more.36 
                                                          
33 C Hoexter “A rainbow of one colour? Judicial review on substantive grounds in South African law” in H 
Willberg and M Elliot. The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review (2015). See also Khosa v Minister of 
Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para 67 where the Court stated that “[t]he test for rationality is a 
relatively low one.  As long as the government purpose is legitimate and the connection between the law and the 
government purpose is rational and not arbitrary, the test will have been met”. 
34 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC). 
35 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) at para 29. 
36 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) at para 38. These statements were 
reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court more recently in its judgment in Democratic Alliance v President of the 
RSA 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) at para 42 where the Court held that the requirement of rationality sets the “lowest 
possible threshold for the validity of executive action” and explained that the reason for adopting such a low 
level test was to give the legislative and executive branches of government the widest possible latitude within 





In the years that have followed the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, however, the principle 
of legality, and especially the test rationality, has developed into a much broader and more 
stringent legal mechanism. In a series of recent judgments both the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal have expanded the test for rationality to encompass procedural 
fairness (see, for example, Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation)37 and 
the giving of reasons (see, for example, Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council).38  
 
In addition, both courts have also applied the test for rationality in a much more stringent 
manner, one which appears to be approaching not only the test for rationality set out in the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (“PAJA”)39 (see, for example, SA Predator 
Breeders’ Association v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism),40 but even the test 
for reasonableness, which include proportionality (see, for example, Zealand v Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Development41 and Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA).42 
  
The expanded and enhanced test for rationality, however, has been criticised by academic 
commentators. Apart from denouncing the enhanced test on the grounds that it subverts the 
right to just administrative action guaranteed in section 33 of the Constitution43 and the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (the “PAJA”),44 academic commentators have also 
criticised the expanded and enhanced test on the grounds that it infringes the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. Kohn, for example, argues that the courts are using the expanded and 
enhanced rationality test to increase their reservoir of judicial power and expand their 
supervisory review jurisdiction in a manner that is inconsistent with the principle of the 
separation of powers doctrine.45  
                                                          
37 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC). See also Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre 2013 (6) SA 421 (SCA) and eTV 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Communications [2016] ZASCA 85 (31 May 2016).  
38 2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA). 
39 3 of 2000. 
40 [2011] 2 All SA 529 (SCA). 
41 2008 (4) SA 458 (CC). 
42 Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
43 Section 33 of the Constitution provides that: “(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. (2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by 
administrative action has the right to be given written reasons. (3) National legislation must be enacted to give 
effect to these rights, and must (a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; (b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in 
subsections (1) and (2); and (c) promote an efficient administration”. 
44 3 of 2000. 
45 L Kohn “The burgeoning constitutional requirement of rationality and the separation of powers: has 





“The principle concern of this article is that in developing such an expansive substantive conception of rationality 
review – in the absence of meaningful engagement with the prescripts of the separation of powers doctrine – and 
thereby increasing their reservoir of judicial power, the courts may be perceived to be expanding their supervisory 
review jurisdiction in a manner that amounts to an affront to this doctrine. In particular, given our current political 
climate and the disconcerting attacks against the judiciary for being counter-majoritarian, the extension of the 
more onerous review grounds, designated for the carefully crafted realm of administrative action to decisions of 
a discretionary nature in the political realm, may lead to the gradual chipping away of our court’s fiercely guarded 
institutional security and thus the ‘authoritative legitimacy’ that lies at the heart of their power”. 46 
 
It is not entirely clear, however, whether this criticism is entirely justified. This is because a 
careful examination of the case law shows that while the courts are willing to apply the 
expanded and enhanced rationality test to executive action (see, for example, Democratic 
Alliance v President of the RSA), they are reluctant to do so to legislative action (see, for 
example, Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the RSA47 and Poverty Alleviation 
Network v President of the RSA).48 The distinction drawn by the courts between executive and 
legislative action, it will be argued, is consistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers 
and particularly with a substantive theory of the separation of powers that reflects the 
participatory nature of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
 
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to determine whether the expanded and enhanced 
rationality standard is consistent with a substantive theory of the separation of powers which 
is consistent with participatory democracy. 
 
5. The research question 
As stated above, the purpose of this study is to determine whether the expanded and enhanced 
rationality standard is consistent with a substantive theory of the separation of powers which 
is consistent with participatory democracy. 
 
More particularly, the purpose of this thesis is to:  
 Set out and discuss the rationality test; 
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 Set out and discuss the separation of powers; 
 Critically analyse the manner in which the expanded and enhanced rationality test is 
applied to legislative action; 
 Critically analyse the manner in which the expanded and enhanced rationality test is 
applied to executive action; and 
 Determine whether the manner in which the expanded and enhanced rationality test is 
applied to legislative and executive action is consistent with a substantive theory of the 
separation of powers which is consistent with participatory democracy. 
 
6. The methodology 
This thesis is based on a qualitative approach as opposed to an empirical or quantitative 
approach. As such it will involve a desktop review, analysis and critical evaluation of various 
legal materials. Both primary and secondary legal authorities will be explored in an attempt to 
provide for the trace and proof for historical legal trends, exposing contradictions and 
inconsistencies between some theoretical and practical observations of applications of some 
legal principles and also providing for suggestions. 
 
7. The structure of the study 
This thesis will be divided into five chapters. These chapters will be as follows: 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
The background, the research question and the research methodology are set out and discussed 
in Chapter One. In addition, the structure of the thesis is also set out in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Two: The principle of the rule of law 
The historical origins of the rule of law as well as certain formalist and substantive versions of 
the rule of law are set out and discussed in Chapter Two. In addition, the implications of the 
substantive versions for the separation of powers will also be examined. 
 
Chapter Three: Rationality, the right to procedural fairness and the right to be given reasons 
The minimalist version of the test for rationality which was initially adopted by the 




minimum version has subsequently been expanded to include the right to procedural fairness 
as well as the right to be given reasons is also examined. 
 
Chapter Four: Rationality, enhanced rationality and reasonableness 
The differences between the minimalist version of the test for rationality initially adopted under 
the principle of legality, the enhanced version of test for rationality set out in section 6(2)(f)(ii) 
of PAJA and the test for reasonableness set out in section 6(2)(h) of PAJA are set out and 
discussed in Chapter Four. The stricter application of the minimalist version is also examined. 
 
Chapter Five: The doctrine of the separation of powers 
The origins, purpose and elements of the separation of powers are set out and discussed in 
Chapter Five. The counter-majoritarian difficulty and its implications for the power of judicial 
review are also considered. A substantive theory for the separation of powers which is 
consistent with a participatory democracy is also proposed. 
 
Chapter Six: Analysis and Conclusion 
The manner in which the courts have applied the expanded test for rationality to legislative and 
executive action is set out and discussed in Chapter Six. Following this discussion a number of 
concluding points are made. 
 
8. The limitations of the study 
This study will only be limited to what is relevant to the study of rationality. Although some 
other grounds of review beyond rationality principle may be inflicted, they will only be 
discussed insofar as they define the scope of rationality. This is referred to as “proof by 
contradiction” which is to define what something is not to prove and contrast what it is. This 
is exactly the purpose of possibly consulting other grounds of review to prove what rationality 










CHAPTER TWO: THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
1. Introduction 
Before turning to discuss the way in which the test for rationality been interpreted and applied 
by the courts in South Africa, it is important to set out and discuss the principle of the rule of 
law from a conceptual perspective. This conceptual perspective will help to locate the test for 
rationality, which is an aspect of the principle of legality which in turn is an incidence of the 
principle of the rule of law, in a theoretical framework. This theoretical framework will 
facilitate a critical assessment of the manner in which the South African courts have interpreted 
and applied the test for rationality in light of the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
 
2. The origins of the principle of the rule of law 
Although the principle of the rule of law is sometimes traced back to clauses 39 and 40 of the 
Magna Carta, which King John of England (1166-1216) was compelled to sign at Runnymede 
by a group of rebel barons on 15 June 1215,49 the more modern version (including the term 
itself) is usually traced back to the English constitutional law scholar Professor Albert Venn 
Dicey (1835-1922), who used it his book An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (1885).50  
 
In this book Dicey argued that the rule of law encompasses three principles: 
 
The first principle is usually referred to as the principle of the supremacy of the law and it states 
that the ordinary law is supreme and that a person cannot be deprived of his or her rights 
through the arbitrary exercise of discretionary power. Dicey himself described this principle as 
follows: 
 
“We mean, in the first place that no man is punishable or can lawfully be made to suffer in body or goods except 
for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land”.51 
                                                          
49 Clause 39 of the Magna Carta, which means Great Charter, provides that “[n]o free man shall be taken, 
imprisoned, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against or prosecute him, except 
by the lawful judgment of his equals and the by law of the land”. Clause 40 provides that “[t]o no one will we 
sell, to no one will we deny, or delay, right or justice”. 
50 AV Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 9ed (1945). 




The second principle is usually referred to as the principle of equality and it states that no 
person, including state officials and especially high-ranking state officials, is above the law and 
that every person is subject to the same laws and the jurisdiction of the same normal courts. 
Dicey described this principle as follows: 
 
“We mean in the second place, when we speak of ‘the rule of law’ as a characteristic of our country, not only that 
with us no man is above the law, but (which is a different thing) that here, every man, whatever be his rank or 
condition, is subject to the ordinary laws of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals”.52 
 
The third principle is referred to as the general principle and it provides that the fundamental 
rights of the individual are protected by the ordinary remedies contained in the common law 
and provided by the normal courts, rather than by a Bill of Fundamental Rights. Dicey 
described this principle as follows: 
 
“There remains yet a third and a different sense in which the ‘rule of law’ . . . may be described as a special 
attribute of English institutions. We may say that the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground 
that the general principles of the constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right to public 
meetings) are with us the result if judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases 
brought before the courts; whereas under many foreign constitutions the security (such as it is) given to the rights 
of individuals results, or appears to result, from the general principles of the constitution”. 53 
 
Dicey’s [third] principle was inferred from a comparison between the positions in Britain and 
elsewhere in Western Europe, where various constitutions contained extensive bills of rights 
without effective mechanisms for their enforcement. It is now generally acceptable that a 
judicially enforceable bill of rights provides better protection to the individual than a system 
which “sovereignty of parliament” forms the basis of constitutional law.54 
 
In the decades that have followed the publication of Dicey’s book, several different versions 
of the rule of law have been developed. These versions may be divided into two categories, 
namely formalist versions and substantive versions.55 These categories lay down a fundamental 
framework on how the rule of law at least from a theoretical understanding should be perceived. 
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54 B Z Tamanaha On the rule of law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) at 104. L Fuller The Morality of Law 
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Each of these categories will be discussed in turn starting with the formalist versions and then 
going on to the substantive versions. 
 
3. Formalist versions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As Kruger has pointed out, “formal versions of the rule of law focus on the procedure or manner 
of the promulgation of laws and do not set any requirements for the content of laws”.56 Formal 
versions of the rule of law, however, “do not seek to pass judgment upon the actual content of 
the law itself. They are not concerned with whether the law was in that sense a good law or a 
bad law, provided that the formal precepts of the rule of law were themselves met”.57  
 
Some formal versions of the rule of law encompass only a few requirements and are usually 
referred to as thin versions of the rule of law while others encompass more requirements and 
are usually referred to as thick versions of the rule of law. Generally speaking thicker formal 
versions of the rule of law incorporate the requirements that make up the preceding thinner 
formal versions. Tamanaha distinguishes between three formal versions of the rule of law: “rule 
by law” (which is the thinnest); “formal legality” (which is thicker); and “democracy plus 
legality” (which is the thickest).58 Each of these will be considered in turn below. 
 
3.2 Rule by law 
The rule by law version of the rule of law simply provides that the state must act in accordance 
with a valid law irrespective of its procedural and/or substantive characteristics. Or, to put it 
another way, the state may only exercise those powers that have been vested in it by the law, 
but the law itself does not have to comply with any procedural or substantive requirements. It 
simply has to be law.59 
 
                                                          
56 See R Krüger “The South African Constitutional Court and the rule of law: The Masetlha judgment, a cause 
for concern?” (2010) 13(3) PER/ PELJ 468 at 476. 
57 See P Craig “Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: An analytical framework” 1997 Public 
Law at 1/469. See also Supra Kruger at 476. 
58 See B Z Tamanaha On the rule of law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) at 91. 
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for concern?” (2010) 13(3) PER/ PELJ 468 at 476. B Z Tamanaha On the rule of law: History, Politics, Theory 
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3.3 Formal legality  
 
(a) Introduction 
The formal legality version of the rule of law accepts the requirements set out in the rule by 
law version but goes on to impose at least some procedural requirements on the state’s authority 
to make and implement laws. These procedural requirements are usually said to be the 
following: that the law must be general in nature; that it must be prospective and not 
retrospective; and that it must be clear, that it must be open and that it must be relative stable.60 
Each of these requirements is discussed in more detail below. 
 
(i) Laws should be general 
This requirement provides that laws should apply equally to everyone, except to the extent that 
objective differences justify differentiation, for example race and gender. In addition, it also 
provides that laws should not target individuals. In other words, there should be no bills of 
attainder. A bill of attainder is one which singles out a group or individual for punishment 
without following a fair process. 61 
 
(ii) Laws should be prospective and not retrospective 
This requirement provides that laws should only take effect after they have been passed. In 
other words, that laws should apply into the future and not into the past. There are a number of 
reasons for this requirement. Perhaps the most important is that people cannot be expected to 
comply with the law if the law does not exist or has not been introduced. This is because they 
cannot adjust their behaviour to comply with the law, even if they wanted to.62 
 
(iii) Laws should be clear, open and stable 
This requirement provides that laws should not be vague, that they should not be made in secret 
and that they should not be constantly changing. In other words, that laws should be reasonably 
easy to understandable and reasonably easy to access. Once again, there are a number of 
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61 See A Mathews Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law (1986) at 6. See also T Bingham The rule of law 
(2010) at 55. 




reasons why laws must be clear, open and stable. Perhaps the most important is that people 
cannot be expected to comply with the law if they cannot understand or access the law or if the 
law is in a state of constant change.63 
 
(b) Joseph Raz’s formal legality 
Apart from the requirements set out above, Joseph Raz added several others. Among these are 
that “the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; the principles of natural justice 
must be observed; the courts should have review powers over the implementation of the 
principles of the rule of law in respect of administrative action and legislation, courts should 
be easily accessible; and the discretion of law enforcement agencies should not be allowed to 
pervert the law”. Raz argues that these requirements are necessary to implement those set out 
above.64 Once again, each of these requirements will be discussed in turn below. 
 
(i) The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed 
This requirement provides that judicial officers must be independent from the other branches 
of government. When judicial officers are independent from the other branches of government, 
they are more likely to uphold the requirements of the rule of law without fear, favour or 
prejudice.65 
 
                                                          
63 See A Mathews Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law (1986) at 6 and 7. See also T Bingham The rule 
of law (2010) at 37. 
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violated; a procedure or a condition required by law has not been complied with in the making of a decision; the 
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the provisions of the law in terms of which it purports to have been made; the decision was materially 
influenced by an error of law or fact; the decision was made for an ulterior motive or purpose; and the decision 
was otherwise contrary to the law. Even before the interim Constitution was adopted these reports had a 
profound influence on the common law. This is because in Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand 
Nigel Ltd 1988 (3) SA 132 (A) the Appellate Division held that an administrative decision may be reviewed and 
set aside if the decision-maker failed to apply his mind to the relevant issues in accordance with the “behests of 
the statute and the tenets of natural justice”. Such a failure, the Appellate Division held further, may be shown, 
inter alia, by proof that: the decision was arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously or mala fide; or as a result of 
unwarranted adherence to a fixed principle; or in order to further an ulterior or improper purpose; or that the 
decision-maker misconceived the nature of the discretion conferred upon him and took into account irrelevant 
considerations or ignore relevant ones; or that the decision as so grossly unreasonable as to warrant the inference 
that he failed to apply his mind to the matter. 




(ii) The principles of natural justice must be observed 
This requirement provides that everyone is entitled to a fair hearing. At a minimum these means 
that each party must be given an opportunity to present his or her case (audi alteram partem 
(hear the other side)) and that the judicial officer must be impartial (nemo judex in sua causa 
(no one may be a judge in their own case)). When the principles of natural justice are observed, 
the judicial officer is much more likely to interpret and apply the law correctly.66 
  
(iii) The courts should have review powers over the implementation of the principles of the 
rule of law 
This requirement provides that the courts should have the authority to review the manner in 
which the other branches of government have implemented the requirements of the rule of law. 
An important consequence of this requirement is that the courts should also have the power to 
declare law or conduct which infringes the principles of the rule of law to be invalid and to set 
such law or conduct aside.67 
 
(iv) The courts should be easily accessible 
Given the central position of the courts in ensuring the rule of law, this requirement provides 
that the courts must be accessible to all, including both the rich and the poor, the strong and the 
weak. In addition, it also means that matters should be dealt with timeously and long delays 
should be avoided.68 
 
(v) The discretion of law enforcement agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law 
This requirement provides that the conduct of the police and the prosecuting authorities should 
not be allowed to subvert the law. The police, for example, should not be allowed to allocate 
their resources to avoid the prevention or detection of certain crimes or to avoid prosecuting 
certain classes of criminals. Similarly, the prosecution should not be allowed to decide not to 
prosecute the commission of certain crimes, or crimes committed by certain classes of 
offenders. This aspect is closely linked to the principle that laws should be general and that 
they should be open, stable and clear. This is because it provides that there must  be established 
rules guiding when and how the police, the prosecuting authorities and other agencies must 
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function. This will assist in ensuring that there is no abuse of power or bias on the side of the 
agencies but rather that the public receive equal and uniform treatment.69 
 
3.4 Democracy plus legality 
Finally, the democracy plus legality version of the rule of law accepts the requirements set out 
in the rule by law and formal legality versions, but goes on to provides that the people must 
also consent to the laws that govern their lives and they must be allowed to do so through a 
democratic process. The reason why the people must consent to the laws that govern their lives 
through a democratic process, the theorists who support this version argue, is because it 
legitimates the law and thus provides an important, if not the most important, ground on which 
the law can base its authority and, especially, its coercive authority.70 
 
4. Substantive legality 
 
4.1 Introduction 
While the formal versions of the principle of the rule of law, and especially the thicker versions, 
go a long way towards ensuring that the state does not abuse the power that has been conferred 
upon it, all of the formal versions suffer from the fact that they do not place any limitations or 
restrictions on the substantive content of laws. As a result it is possible that even a law which 
complies with the requirements democracy plus legality may still be a bad law.  
 
As Tamanaha points out, in a democracy the legislature has the authority to makes changes to 
the law whenever it desires. An organised cabal or subgroup, therefore, may use the democratic 
system (which occasionally experiences dramatic swings in public sentiment) as a mechanism 
to acquire control of the legislature. It can then use the legislature to pass laws aimed at 
advancing its particular agenda, while simultaneously claiming the legitimacy conferred by its 
participation in the democratic system. “Democracy”, he points out further, “is a blunt and 
unwieldy mechanism that offers no assurance of producing morally good laws”.71 
 
In order to address this weakness in the formal versions of the principle of the rule of law, 
substantive versions encompass the requirements of all of the formal versions but go further 
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and impose restrictions on the substantive content of the laws. Like the formal versions of the 
rule of law, some substantive versions encompass only a few requirements and are referred to 
as thin versions, while others encompass more requirements and are referred to as thicker 
versions. Also like the formal versions, the thicker substantive versions incorporate the 
restrictions that make up the preceding thinner versions. Tamanaha distinguishes between two 
substantive versions of the rule of law: a “thin” version and a “thick” version.72 Each of these 
will be considered in turn below. 
 
4.2 The “thin” version of the rule of law 
The thin substantive version of the rule of law provides that the law must promote and protect 
individual civil and political rights, such as the right to equality, the right to freedom of 
expression, the right to freedom of religion, the right to privacy, the right to property and the 
right not to be treated in a cruel and inhuman manner. This substantive version is particularly 
concerned about the potential of the state to abuse the power that has been conferred upon it. 
It thus imposes a negative duty on the state to refrain from unlawfully interfering in the private 
lives of individuals. This version also provides that individual civil and political rights do not 
depend for their existence on a Bill of Rights. This is because they are derived from the rule of 
law itself. In terms of this version, therefore, the rule of law is regarded as a mini-Bill of 
Rights.73 
 
4.3 The “thick” version of the rule of law 
The thick substantive versions of the rule of law provides that the law must not only promote 
and protect individual civil and political rights, but also social and economic rights, such as the 
right to education, the right to health care, the right to housing and the rights to food and water. 
This thick version of the rule of law is particularly concerned with the establishment by the 
state of the social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which a person’s 
legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realised. It thus imposes an affirmative duty on the 
state to help make life better for the people, to enhance their existence, including effectuating 
a measure of distributive justice.74 
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4.4 The substantive version of the rule of law and the separation of powers 
While both the thin and thick substantive versions of the rule of law address the criticism 
levelled against the formal versions by imposing limitations or restrictions on the substantive 
content of law in order to protect human rights, they give rise to their own difficulties. The 
most significant of these is that they threaten the separation of powers between the judicial 
branch of government and the legislative and executive branches of government (the political 
branches). 
 
The reason why the substantive versions threaten the separation of powers between the judicial 
branch of government and the political branches is because they give the courts the power to 
review the content and thus potentially the merits of the decisions made by the political 
branches, which are often based on policy (ideological, moral, political and religious) 
considerations. The substantive versions of the rule of law thus potentially allow the courts to 
intrude very far into the terrain the political branches.   
  
As Tamanaha points out, this may lead to conflict between the judicial and political branches 
of government: 
 
“When courts, in the name of protecting individual rights, squelch democratic law-making too much, their conduct 
can result in a backlash that prompts the judiciary to restrain its conduct. A notorious example of this was the 
1930s US Supreme Court, which invalidated social welfare legislation until President Roosevelt proposed to 
enlarge the Court as means to appoint more compliant Justices; this ‘court packing plan’ failed to obtain 
Congressional support, but the Court took notice and halted its obstructionist practice”.75 
 
Apart from threatening the separation of powers, Tamanaha points out further, the substantive 
version may also be undemocratic. This is because unlike the political branches, the courts are 
not elected by the people. This means that not only do judicial decisions lack democratic 
legitimacy, but also that they cannot be overturned by the people. In addition, because human 
rights are indeterminate there may be reasonable disagreements about the merits of policy 
decisions. As a result, a democratic society may find itself where it is ruled by a bevy of 
Platonic Guardians deciding on the content of rights and the validity of policy decisions in 
accordance with their own subjective views. 
 
                                                          




“No concern would arise from [allocating the power to review legislation and executive decisions to the courts] 
if the content and application of rights were readily apparent, but as already indicated that is often not the case. 
Here the indeterminacy problem discussed in Chapter Six is most acute. If judges consult their own subjective 
views to fill in the content of rights, the system would no longer be the rule of law, but the rule of the men and 
women who happen to be the judges. Substitute one judge for another with different views, or get a different mix 
of judges, and the result might be different. It amounts to a clutch of Platonic Guardians presiding over the 
common people and their representatives”.76 
 
5. Conclusion 
Having briefly set out and discussed the principle of the rule of law from a conceptual 
perspective, we may now turn to discuss the manner in which the test for rationality been 
interpreted and applied by the courts in South Africa. In this respect we will begin by discussing 
the manner in which the courts have expanded the minimalist version of the test for rationality 
to include the right to procedural fairness and the right to be given reasons (Chapter Three). 
Thereafter, we will discuss the manner in which the courts have enhanced to the minimalist 
version to bring it in line either with the enhanced version of the test for rationality set out in 
section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA and even the test for reasonableness set out in section 6(2)(h) of 












                                                          




CHAPTER THREE: RATIONALITY, THE RIGHT PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND 
THE RIGHT TO BE GIVEN REASONS 
 
1. Introduction 
As we saw in Chapter One, the test for rationality may be traced back to the judgments in 
Prinsloo v Van der Merwe77(equality); New National Party v Government of the RSA78 
(legislation);and Pharmaceutical Manufactures: In re the Ex parte Application of the 
President79 (executive conduct) where the Constitutional Court held, not only that rationality 
is a requirement of the principle of legality, but also that this requirement essentially provides 
that a decision (legislation or executive conduct) must be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose, otherwise it will in effect be arbitrary and inconsistent with the 
Constitution.80 
 
In the same chapter we also saw that following these judgments, and especially the judgment 
in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, it appeared as though the test for rationality would 
be applied only on very rare occasions for the following two reasons: 
 First, because the principle of legality itself is a residual ground of review and, 
accordingly, that it should be used only in very limited circumstances, namely when no 
other ground of review is applicable. 
 Second, because, as it was defined and described by the Constitutional Court in the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, the test for rationality established a minimum 
threshold requirement for the exercise of public power.81 
 
In the years that have followed the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case, however, both the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal have expanded the test for rationality 
to encompass procedural fairness (see, for example, Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence 
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and Reconciliation)82 and the giving of reasons (see, for example, Judicial Service Commission 
v Cape Bar Council).83  
 
In addition, they have applied rationality in a much more stringent manner, one which appears 
to be approaching not only the test for rationality set out in the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (“PAJA”)84 (see, for example, SA Predator Breeders’ Association v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism),85 but even the test for reasonableness, which include 
proportionality (see, for example, Zealand v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development86 and Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA).87 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the key judgments in which the courts have expanded 
the test for rationality to include the right to procedural fairness, the right to procedural 
rationality and the right to be given reasons. The judgments in which the courts have applied 
the test for rationality in a more stringent manner will be discussed in the next chapter. Before 
turning to consider these judgments, however, it will be helpful to discuss the two elements 
that make up the minimalist version of the rationality requirement in more detail, namely a 
legitimate governmental purpose and whether the means used are rationally related to that 
purpose.  
 
2. A legitimate governmental purpose 
This is the first element of minimum test for rationality. Under this element of the test, a litigant 
can challenge a decision based on the argument that the purpose sought to be achieved is 
illegitimate in a constitutional democracy. It is worth noting that very little (if any) judicial 
attention has been given to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the purpose. Instead, the emphasis 
has overwhelmingly focused on the relationship between the decision and the purpose. There 
is no doubt, however, that a litigant may use this element to successfully challenge a decision. 
This means that before even proceeding to question whether a rational link exists between a 
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decision and the purpose of that decision, one can question the legitimacy of the purpose 
itself.88 
 
In order to fulfil this element, a court must be satisfied that the decision serves at least one 
legitimate purpose. This will require the court to, first, identify the purpose of the decision and 
then, second, to determine whether it is legitimate. While the purpose may be identified by 
applying the normal principles of interpretation, it is not clear how a court will determine 
whether that purpose is legitimate. This is because it calls for a value judgment. Price argues 
in this respect that the courts do not have an unrestrained discretion to determine whether the 
purpose is legitimate. Instead, he argues further, the courts must determine whether the purpose 
is legitimate by taking into account the Constitution’s “objective, normative value system”. 
Only if the purpose is inconsistent with this value system may it be declared illegitimate.89 
 
3. The relationship between the means used and the purpose sought to be achieved 
This is the second element of the minimum test for rationality. As pointed out above, judicial 
attention has focused almost exclusively on this element. In order to fulfil this element, a court 
simply has to determine whether there is a rational connection between a decision and its 
legitimate purpose. Like the “legitimacy” requirement, however, the “rational connection” 
requirement is also vague. This is because the test for rationality does not indicate how, or how 
well, the decision should serve its purpose. Price argues in this respect, however, that a decision 
will be rationally connected to its purpose in at least two circumstances: first, where it is 
capable of achieving its purposes as a matter of fact (i.e. when there is a causal link); and, 
secondly, where it is capable of achieving its purpose in a symbolic sense (i.e. where it has an 
intrinsic value). He also argues that where a decision is not capable of achieving its purpose at 
all, then it is clearly irrational.90 
 
Having discussed the two elements that make up the minimalist version of the rationality 
requirement, we may now turn to discuss the key judgments in which the courts have expanded 
the test for rationality to include the right to procedural fairness and the right to be given 
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reasons, namely Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation91 and Judicial 
Service Commission v Cape Bar Council.92  
 
4. Rationality and the right to a fair procedure 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The Constitutional Court’s approach to the principle of legality and the right to a fair procedure 
has evolved over time.  
 
Initially, in Masetlha v President of the RSA,93 the Court held that the right to a fair procedure 
is not a self-standing requirement of the principle of legality. Then, in Albutt v Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation,94 the Court held that while the right to a fair procedure 
is not a self-standing requirement, it may enforced as a part of the test for rationality, but only 
in certain limited circumstances.  
 
Most recently, in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau95 the Court stated, but 
did not decide, that the right to a fair procedure may in fact be a self-standing requirement of 
the principle of legality. Despite the confusion the Court’s evolving jurisprudence has given 
rise to, in light of the judgment in Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation96 
there is no doubt that the test for rationality does encompass the right to a fair procedure in 
certain limited circumstances.  
 
4.2 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation  
 
(a) The facts 
The facts of this case are as follows. In late 2007 former President Mbeki announced that he 
intended to create a “special dispensation” in terms of which certain political prisoners could 
apply for a pardon under section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution, which provides that the President 
is responsible for “pardoning or reprieving offenders”. The political prisoners who could apply 
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in terms of this special programme, he also announced, were those who had been convicted of 
a political crime which had been committed before 16 June 1999 and who had decided not to 
participate in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (the “TRC’s”) amnesty process for 
whatever reason.  
 
At the same time that he announced the special dispensation, former President Mbeki also 
explained that the fundamental objectives of this dispensation were the interest of nation-
building, national reconciliation and the further enhancement of national cohesion, and to make 
a further break with matters which arose from the conflicts of the past. In addition, he also 
explained that in deciding whether to grant a pardon or not he would “be guided by the 
principles and values which underpin the Constitution, including the principles and objectives 
of nation-building and national reconciliation” and that he would “uphold and be guided by the 
principles, criteria and spirit that inspired and underpinned the process of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, especially as they relate to the amnesty process”.97  
 
After former President Mbeki had made his announcement in Parliament, a coalition of non-
governmental organisations lead by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(the respondents) made several attempts to obtain the participation of the victims (of the 
offences in respect of which pardons were sought) in the special dispensation process. 
Unfortunately, all of these attempts were rejected by the Office of the President which argued 
that neither the Terms of Reference for the special dispensation nor the Explanatory 
Memorandum not any law compelled the President to grant the victims of the offences a 
hearing before he made his decision whether to grant a pardon or not. 
 
After the President refused to grant the victims of the offences a hearing, the respondents 
applied to the High Court for an order compelling the President to do so. In their application, 
the respondents submitted that the President’s decision to grant a pardon is an administrative 
decision and, consequently that it had to comply with fair procedure provisions set out in 
section 3(2) of the PAJA.98 The High Court agreed with the respondents and granted the order. 
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The applicants then appealed to the Constitutional Court. In the Constitutional Court the key 
question that had to be answered was whether the President was required, prior to the exercise 
of the power to grant pardon to this group of convicted prisoners, to follow a fair procedure 
and afford the victims of these offences a hearing. 
 
(b) The judgment  
The Constitutional Court found in favour of the respondents and dismissed the appeal. In 
arriving at this decision, the Court began its judgment by stating that it was not necessary to 
determine whether the President’s decision to grant a pardon is an administrative or executive 
act. It is a well-established principle of South Africa’s system of constitutional law, the Court 
stated further, that the exercise of all power, including the power to grant a pardon in terms of 
section 84(2)(j), has to comply with the principle of legality which is an incident of the rule of 
law. The principle of legality, the Court went on to state, provides that every exercise of power, 
at a minimum has to be rational.99 
 
When it came to determining whether the President’s decision to grant a pardon was rational 
or not, the Constitutional Court pointed out, it had to determine whether the decision not to 
grant the victims of the offences in respect of which pardons were being sought (the means) a 
hearing was rationally related to the objectives the President was seeking to achieve with the 
special dispensation, namely nation building, national reconciliation and the further 
enhancement of national cohesion (the ends).100 
 
After setting out these principles, the Constitutional Court turned to apply them to the facts. In 
this respect the Court held that affording a hearing to the victims of the offences in respect of 
which pardons were being sought was fundamental to the special dispensation. This is because 
the participation of both victims and perpetrators was crucial to the achievement of the 
objectives that underpinned the TRC and especially the amnesty process of the TRC, namely 
nation building, national reconciliation and the further enhancement of national cohesion.101 
 
“The participation of victims was fundamental to the amnesty process. The process encouraged victims and their 
dependants “to unburden their grief publicly, to receive the collective recognition of a new nation that they were 
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wronged, and, crucially, to help them to discover what did in truth happen to their loved ones”. But the truth of 
what really happened could only be known if those who were responsible for gross violations of human rights 
were encouraged to disclose it with the incentive that they would not be punished. Thus, the participation of both 
the victims and the perpetrators was crucial to the achievement of the twin objectives of rebuilding a nation torn 
apart by an evil system and promoting reconciliation between the people of South Africa”.  102 
 
In light of the fact that the objectives of the TRC’s amnesty process could be achieved only 
through the active participation of both the victims and the perpetrators, the Constitutional 
Court held further, it followed as a matter of simple logic that the objectives of the special 
dispensation could also be achieved only through the active participation of both the victims 
and the perpetrators. The participation of the victims, therefore was implicit in the specific 
features of the special dispensation process.103 
 
“In these circumstances, the requirement to afford the victims a hearing is implicit, if not explicit, in the very 
specific features of the special dispensation process. Indeed, the context-specific features of the special 
dispensation and in particular its objectives of national unity and national reconciliation, require, as a matter of 
rationality, that the victims must be given the opportunity to be heard in order to determine the facts on which 
pardons are based”.104 
 
Given these points, the Constitutional Court then concluded, the decision to exclude the victims 
of the offences in respect of which pardons were sought under the special dispensation process 
was irrational. Accordingly, the victims of these crimes were entitled to be given the 
opportunity to be heard before the President he made a decision whether to grant a pardon 
under the special dispensation or not.105 
 
The Constitutional Court, however, made a significant remark that the question whether 
victims of other categories of applications for pardon are entitled to be heard is left open. The 
granting of hearing applied to this category of applications for pardon only for specific 
purposes. It therefore did not mean that granting of hearing to pardon applications would 
operate as a general rule. This would differ from one case to another.106 
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“Lest there be a misunderstanding of the scope of this conclusion, I had better stress the obvious. This case is 
concerned with applications for pardon under the special dispensation. What I have said in this judgment therefore 
applies to this category of applications for pardon only. What distinguishes this category from others not before 
us is that the crimes in respect of which pardons are sought are alleged to have been committed with a political 
motive; the objective of these pardons is to promote national unity and reconciliation; and the crimes concerned 
were committed in a particular historical context. Different considerations may very well apply to other categories 
of applications for pardon. This judgment does not therefore decide the question whether victims of other 
categories of applications for pardon are entitled to be heard. That question is left open”.107 
 
(c) Comment 
Although the Constitutional Court explicitly stated that its findings were limited to the peculiar 
facts of the case and, therefore, could not necessarily be applied in other circumstances, it 
opened up the space for the further development of the test for rationality in this respect. As 
Hoexter has pointed out, it is difficult to think of a decision whose rationality would not be 
improved by giving both sides an opportunity to present their case. It is, consequently, not 
surprising that in Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre108 and eTV (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Communications109 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the failure to consult with 
interested parties was irrational and thus infringed the principle of legality. Each of these 
judgment will be discussed in turn. 
 
4.3 Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre 
 
(a) The facts 
The facts of this case are as follows. In May 2012, the Director-General of the Department of 
Home Affairs decided that applications for asylum in terms of the Refugees Act110 would no 
longer be accepted and processed by the Refugee Reception Office (the “RRO”) in Cape Town 
(the CT RRO”). Instead, applications for asylum would in future have to be submitted at RROs 
in other provinces and especially in provinces located along the northern borders of South 
Africa. 
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After the Director-General took this decision, the respondent, which was a non-profit 
organisation established to assist displaced persons and migrant communities, applied to the 
High Court for an order setting aside this decision. The High Court granted the order and the 
Minister then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. In this court the respondent raised 
several arguments. One of these was that the Director-General’s decision was an administrative 
act and, accordingly, that it had to comply with the fair procedure provisions of section 3(2) of 
the PAJA. Unfortunately, they argued further, the facts showed that the Director-General’s 
decision did not comply with section 3(2) and, consequently, that it was invalid. 
 
(b) The judgment 
The Supreme Court of Appeal found in favour of the respondents and dismissed the appeal. In 
arriving at this decision, the Court first had to determine whether the Director-General’s 
decision could be classified as an administrative act. After carefully examining the nature of 
the decision and the consideration which the Director-General had to take into account, the 
Court held that it could not be classified as an administrative act. Instead, it had to be classified 
as an executive act.111 
 
Given that the Director-General’s decision was an executive and not an administrative act, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held further, it was not governed by the PAJA, but rather by the 
principle of legality. Insofar as the principle of legality was concerned, the respondent’s had 
argued that this principle imposes a general obligation on those who exercise public power to 
follow a fair procedure and to give interested and affected parties a hearing before taking a 
decision.112 
 
Although this argument went too far and, accordingly, could not be upheld, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal went on to hold, in light of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Albutt it is quite 
clear that there are circumstances in which the failure to follow a fair procedure would be 
irrational and, therefore, would infringe the principle of legality. This means, the Court 
concluded, that procedural fairness is a ground on which executive acts may be reviewed, but 
only to the extent that the test for rationality requires it.113  
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“Nonetheless, there are indeed circumstances in which rational decision-making calls for interested persons to be 
heard. That was recognised in Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation,37 which concerned 
the exercise by the President of the power to pardon offenders whose offences were committed with a political 
motive. One of the questions for decision in that case was whether the President was required, before exercising 
that power, to afford a hearing to victims of the offences. It was held that the decision to undertake the special 
dispensation process under which pardons were granted, without affording the victims an opportunity to be heard, 
must be rationally related to the achievement of the objectives of the process”. 114 
 
After setting out these principles, the Supreme Court of Appeal turned to apply them to the 
facts. In this respect it found that the Director-General had failed to give the respondents and 
other interested and affected parties a hearing before he made his decision to close down the 
CT RRO. The failure to give the respondents and other interested and affected parties a hearing 
was irrational, the Court found further, because the Director-General had in fact promised them 
that he would do so before making his decision because of their special expertise. The Director-
General’s failure to live up to this promise, therefore, was unconstitutional and invalid.115 
 
“That conclusion in this case does not have as a consequence that there is a general duty on decision makers to 
consult organisations or individuals having an interest in their decisions. Such a duty will arise only in 
circumstances where it would be irrational to take the decision without such consultation, because of the special 
knowledge of the person or organisation to be consulted, of which the decision maker is aware. Here the 
irrationality arises because the Director-General, through his representatives, at the meeting on 7 May 2012, 
acknowledged the necessity for such consultation. That he did so is not surprising bearing in mind that the 
organisations represented at that meeting included not only the Scalabrini Centre, with its close links to the refugee 
community, but also the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and organisations close to the 
challenges relating to alleged refugees”.116 
 
(c) Comment 
As we have already seen, in Albutt the Constitutional Court held that the executive has to follow 
a fair procedure if this is the only rational way in which it can achieve the goals that it is has 
set for itself. Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court stated that this principle could not 
necessarily be applied in other circumstances, in Scalabrini the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
taken this principle a step further and held that the executive also has to follow a fair procedure 
when it has promised to do so. It appears, therefore, that the Supreme Court of Appeal at least 
is willing to review the exercise of executive power on the grounds of procedural fairness in a 
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variety of different circumstances. This approach was confirmed in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s subsequent judgment in and eTV (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Communications.117 
 
4.4 eTV (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Communications 
 
(a) The facts 
The facts of the case are as follows. In 2008 the Minister of Communication published the 
Broadcasting Digital Migration Policy (the “Digital Migration Policy”) in terms of s 3(1) of 
the Electronic Communications Act (ECA).118 This Policy was aimed at facilitating the 
migration of television broadcasting signals in South Africa from an analogue terrestrial 
television system to a digital terrestrial television system in order to free up signal space. This 
process is commonly known as the digital migration process.  
 
One of the difficulties that the digital migration process faces is that the majority of privately 
owned television sets in South Africa were designed to receive only analogue signals and, 
consequently, are not capable of receiving a digital signal. In order to overcome this difficulty 
each of these older television sets requires a set-top box (“STB”). Given the high-cost of these 
STBs, however, the government resolved that it would provide them free of charge to poorer 
households. 
 
When the Digital Migration Policy was first published in 2008 it stated that not only would the 
STBs be provided free of charge to poorer households, but also that these STBs would have 
encryption technology. This technology would allow each STB to decrypt signals that have 
been encrypted. Pay television operators usually encrypt their signals in order to ensure that 
only fee-paying subscribers can receive them. Free television operators also use encryption to 
obtain high quality programmes from private studio and to prevent their own programmes 
being pirated. 
 
After it was first published in 2008, the Digital Migration Policy was amended first in 2012, 
then in 2013 and finally in 2015. As a result of these amendments the provisions dealing with 
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encryption technology were changed and eventually the 2015 Digital Migration Policy 
provided that STBs would no longer have encryption technology.  
 
Following the publication of the 2015 Digital Migration Policy, eTV and the other appellants, 
who supported the inclusion of encryption technology, applied to the High Court for an order 
setting aside the decision to amend the Policy. The High Court dismissed the application and 
the appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal, the appellants argued that the Minister’s decision to amend 
the Digital Migration Policy was an administrative act and, accordingly, that it had to comply 
with the fair procedure provisions of section 3(2) of the PAJA. Unfortunately, they argued 
further, the facts showed that the Minister’s decision did not comply with section 3(2) and, 
consequently, that it was invalid. In addition, they also argued that the Minister’s decision was 
irrational and thus breached the principle of legality. 
 
(b) The judgment 
The Supreme Court of Appeal found in favour of the appellants and upheld the appeal. In 
arriving at this decision the Court focused on the principle of legality rather than the right to 
just administrative action. Insofar as the principle of legality was concerned, the Court held, 
inter alia, that “[w]here a policy or policy amendment impacts on rights . . . it is only fair that 
those affected be consulted. Fairness in procedure, and rationality, are at the heart of the 
principle of legality”.119 In addition, the Court held further, the duty to consult arises from the 
value of fairness which underlies the principle of legality.120 After setting out these principles, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal turned to apply them to the facts and found that where a 
significant change has been made to a policy, as in this case, a failure to consult with interested 
and affected parties would be unfair and thus irrational. 121 
 
(c) Comment 
It seems as though the Court in this case was more prepared to pronounce that the process or 
procedure is an aspect of rationality; that the process upon which the decision is taken must be 
fair for the rationality test to have been established regardless of the nature of the decision. 
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However the Court still remained indirect in its judgment of this stand-point and whether this 
would be a correct position given the principle of the separation pf powers in South Africa.   
 
5. Rationality and the right to be given reasons  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Apart from the right to a fair procedure, the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that the test for 
rationality also includes the right to be given reasons, once again in certain limited 
circumstances. This approach was held in the case of Judicial Service Commission and Another 
v Cape Bar Council.122 
 
5.2 Judicial Service Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council  
 
(a) The facts 
The facts of the case were as follows. In 2011 the Judicial Service Commission (the “JSC”) 
advertised three vacancies for judicial appointment in respect of the Western Cape High Court 
in Cape Town (the “WCHC”) and invited suitably qualified persons to apply. Although a 
number of people applied, only seven applicants were shortlisted. These seven applications 
were interviewed by the JSC on 12 April 2011 and after these interviews were concluded the 
JSC recommend the appointment of only one of them. No other recommendations were made. 
Two positions thus remained vacant. 
 
Following the JSC’s recommendations, the Cape Bar Council applied to the High Court for an 
order, inter alia, declaring the JSC’s failure to fill two judicial vacancies in the WCHC to be 
unconstitutional and invalid and directing it to reconsider afresh the applications of the 
shortlisted candidates who were not selected. The High Court granted the application and the 
JSC then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Cape Bar Council based its application 
on two grounds: first, that the JSC was not properly constituted when it made its decision not 
to fill the two vacancies; and, second, that its decision was irrational and thus unconstitutional. 
 
The JSC was not properly constituted, the Cape Bar Council argued, because section 178(1) of 
the Constitution provides that the JSC consists, inter alia, of the President of the Supreme Court 
                                                          




of Appeal and section 178(7) provides that if the President is temporarily unavailable, the 
Deputy-President of the Supreme Court of Appeal must act has his or her alternate. 
Unfortunately, the Cape Bar Council argued further, neither the President nor the Deputy-
President attended the meeting of the JSC on 12 April 2011. This is because the President was 
excused in order to attend another meeting and the Deputy-President was never invited. 
 
The JSC’s decision not to fill the two vacancies was irrational and thus unconstitutional, the 
Cape Bar Council also argued, because when it asked the JSC to provide reasons why it had 
decided not to fill the two vacancies, the JSC’s only response was that none of the unsuccessful 
candidates received a majority of the votes. Unfortunately, the Cape Bar Council argued 
further, this response was no answer at all and it could be inferred from this non-answer that 
the decision not to fill the two vacancies was in fact irrational and thus unconstitutional. 
 
(b) The judgment 
The Supreme Court of Appeal found in favour of the Cape Bar Council and dismissed the 
appeal. In arriving at this decision, the Court began by pointing out that it first had to determine 
whether the decision of the JSC not to fill the two vacancies was reviewable at all. This is 
because the JSC’s power to recommend the appointment of judges of the High Court is 
expressly excluded from the definition of administrative action in the PAJA. While it was true 
that the JSC’s power to recommend the appointment of judges could not be reviewed in terms 
of the PAJA, the Supreme Court of Appeal held, it could still be reviewed in terms of the 
principle of legality and especially the test for rationality. This is because the JSC’s power to 
recommend the appointment of judges is derived from section 174(6) of the Constitution and, 
therefore, is clearly a public power.123  
 
After having found that the JSC’s decision not to fill the two vacancies was reviewable, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal turned to consider the grounds on which the Cape Bar Council had 
based its application, namely: first, that the JSC was not properly constituted when it made its 
decision not to fill the two vacancies; and, second, that its decision was irrational and thus 
unconstitutional 
 
                                                          




Insofar as the first ground was concerned, the JSC argued, inter alia, that section 2(2) of the 
Judicial Service Amendment Act124 expressly provided that meetings of the JSC can be validly 
held and decisions validly taken if the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice are 
unavailable. The same principle, the JSC argued further, must also apply when the President 
and the Deputy-President of the Supreme Court of Appeal are unavailable. This meant, the JSC 
submitted, that even though neither the President of the Supreme Court of his Appeal nor his 
Deputy were present at the meeting on 12 April 2011, it was still valid. 
 
Although there was no doubt that this argument was correct, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held, the difficulty that the JSC faced in the case at hand was that the evidence showed that 
Deputy-President of the Supreme Court of Appeal was not unavailable. In fact he was available 
to attend the meeting of the JSC on 12 April 2011. The problem was that he had simply had 
not been invited to attend the meeting. The meeting of the JSC on that day, therefore, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal concluded, was not properly constituted and its decisions were 
invalid.125 
 
Insofar as the second issue was concerned, the JSC argued (a) that neither the Constitution nor 
any other law imposed an express obligation on it to provide reasons for its decisions; (b) that 
it had in any event given a reason for its decision not to fill the two vacancies, namely that none 
of the unsuccessful candidates had received a majority of the votes; and (c) that because the 
members of the JSC voted in secret, it was not possible it to provide a better or more detailed 
reason than the one it had already give. 
 
While it was true that neither the Constitution nor any other law imposed an express obligation 
on the JSC to provide a reason for its decision not to fill the two vacancies, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal held, such an obligation is implicit in the duty that the principle of legality imposes 
on the JSC to act in a manner that is not irrational or arbitrary. The obligation to give reason is 
implicit in the duty to act in a manner that is not irrational or arbitrary, the Court held further, 
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because this is the only way in which an affected party can determine whether a decision is 
rational or not.126 
 
“But once these premises are accepted as valid, I cannot see how the inference of an obligation to give reasons 
can be avoided. It is difficult to think of a way to account for one’s decisions other than to give reasons (see 
eg Mphahlele v First National Bank of SA Ltd [1999] ZACC1; 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC) para 12). As to rationality, I 
think it is rather cynical to say to an affected individual: you have a constitutional right to a rational decision but 
you are not entitled to know the reasons for that decision. How will the individual ever be able to rebut the defence 
by the decision-maker: ‘Trust me, I have good reasons, but I am not prepared to provide them’? Exemption from 
giving reasons will therefore almost invariably result in immunity from an irrationality challenge. I believe the 
same sentiment to have been expressed by Mokgoro and Sachs JJ when they said in Bell Porto School Governing 
Body v Premier, Western Cape [2002] ZACC 2; 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC) para 159: 
‘The duty to give reasons when rights or interests are affected has been stated to constitute an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial 
review. Unless the person affected can discover the reason behind the decision, he or she may be unable to tell whether it is reviewable or not 
and so may be deprived of the protection of the law’”.127 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal then went on to conclude therefore that the JSC is, as a general 
rule, obliged to give reasons for its decision not to recommend a particular candidate if properly 
called upon to do so.128 
  
(c) Comment 
Even though in this judgment the SCA makes it clear that with regards to giving reasons for 
the decisions taken, each case will be judged on its own merits, it is however undeniable that 
it (the SCA) accepted that reasons giving forms part of rationality which in turn widens the 
scope for the rationality review principle. What lies to be established though is whether these 
reasons should be in writing as per the requirements for the administrative actions set out in 
section 5(2) of PAJA.129 It seems that this precedent serves to further highlight the different 
levels of scrutiny required for reviewing executive and legislative actions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Apart from expanded the minimalist version of the test for rationality to include the right to 
procedural fairness and the right to be given reasons, the courts have also enhanced to the 
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minimalist version to bring it in line either with the enhanced version of the test for rationality 
set out in section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA and even the test for reasonableness set out in section 


































As we saw in Chapter Three, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal have 
not only expanded the scope and ambit of the test for rationality by incorporating the right to 
“procedural fairness and the right to be given reasons”130, they have also enhanced the test for 
rationality by applying it in a more stringent manner. This enhanced approach appears to 
approach not only the test for rationality set out in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
(“PAJA”)131 (see, for example, SA Predator Breeders’ Association v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism),132 but even the test for reasonableness (see, for example, Democratic 
Alliance v President of the RSA133 and Zealand v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Another).134 The purpose of this chapter is to set out and discuss these 
judgments. 
 
2. Administrative rationality 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The test for rationality has always been an important requirement of administrative law. This 
is because in terms of section 33 of the Constitution135 all administrative actions must, inter 
alia, be reasonable136 and rationality is one of the components of the test for reasonableness.  
 
It is consequently not surprising that section 6(2)(f)(ii) of the PAJA provides that an 
administrative act may be reviewed and set aside if it is not rationally connected to: 
 
“(aa) the purpose for which it was taken; 
(bb) the purpose of the empowering decision; 
(cc) the information before the administrator; or 
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(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator”.137 
 
While the tests for rationality set out in paragraphs (aa), (bb) and (dd) appear to be closely 
aligned with minimalist version of the constitutional test for rationality established in the New 
National Party138 and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers cases,139 the test set out in paragraph (cc) 
goes further. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hoexter refers to this administrative test as a 
“rigorous and searching ground”.140 
 
The differences between the “administrative” test for rationality and the minimalist version of 
the constitutional test for rationality, however, appear to have been narrowed by the courts. 
This is most clearly illustrated in the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in SA Predator 
Breeders’ Association v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.141 
 
2.2 SA Predator Breeders’ Association v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism  
 
(a) The facts 
The facts of the case are as follows. On 23 February 2007 the Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism (the “Minister”) published the Threatened or Protected Species Regulations in 
terms of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (the “Biodiversity 
Act”).142 At the same time, he also published lists of critically endangered, vulnerable and 
protected species. In light of the fact that they face a high risk of extinction in the world in the 
medium-term future, the Minister classified lions (panthera leo) as a vulnerable species.143 
 
Apart from classifying lions as a vulnerable species, the Regulation 24(1) of the Threatened or 
Protected Species Regulations also prohibited the hunting of a listed large predator (including 
lions) which was, inter alia, a “put and take” animal. A “put and take” animal was defined in 
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Regulation 1 as a “live specimen of a captive bred listed large predator . . . that is released on 
a property irrespective of the size of the property for the purpose of hunting the animal within 
a period of 24 months”.  
 
In other words, Regulation 24(1) essentially prohibited what is commonly known as the 
“canned hunting” of lions.  
 
The prohibition against canned hunting, however, was subject to an exception set out in 
Regulation 24(2). This exception provided that Regulation 24(1) did not apply to a listed large 
predator bred or kept in captivity which:  
“(a) had been rehabilitated in an extensive wildlife system; and  
(b) had been fending for itself in an extensive wildlife system for at least twenty four 
months.”144 
An important consequence of this exception is that it essentially sterilized the canned hunting 
of lions for a period of 24 months. 
 
After these regulation were published, the appellant, which was a society representing the 
interests of breeders of predators and of hunters of such animals bred in captivity, applied to 
the High Court for an order declaring them to be invalid on the grounds that . The High Court 
refused to grant the application and the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal the appellants based their application on a number of grounds. 
One of these was that the 24 month sterilization of the hunting of captive-bred lions created by 
Regulation 24(2) was irrational. This Regulation was irrational, the appellants argued, for the 
following reasons:  
 First, the period of 24 months bore no rational connection to any legislative purpose of 
the Biodiversity Act. 
 Second, no rational basis existed for the underlying assumption that captive-bred lions 
could be rehabilitated at all. 
 Third, the period of 24 months could not be rationally justified by an information in the 
possession of the Minister when he approved the Regulations. 
 
                                                          




 (b) The judgment 
The Supreme Court of Appeal found in favour of the appellants and upheld the appeal. In 
arriving at this decision, the Court began with a brief discussion of the test for rationality. In 
this respect, the Court held that: 
 
“Rationality, as a necessary element of lawful conduct by a functionary, serves two purposes: to avoid capricious 
or arbitrary action by ensuring that there is a rational relationship between the scheme which is adopted and the 
achievement of a legitimate government purpose or that a decision is rationally related to the purpose for which 
the power was given, and to ensure the action of the functionary bears a rational connection to the facts and 
information available to him and on which he purports to base such action. As noted in the Pharmaceutical case 
at para 90 ‘a decision that is objectively irrational is likely to be made only rarely but, if this does occur a court 
has the power to intervene and set aside an irrational decision’”.145 
 
After setting out these principles the Supreme Court of Appeal turned to apply to the facts. 
 
In this respect, the Supreme Court of Appeal started it analysis by pointing out that the 
Minister’s decision to prohibit the canned hunting of lions had to be read subject to section 
57(2) of the Biodiversity Act. This section provided, inter alia, that the Minister could prohibit 
an activity only if the prohibition would protect the survival of a listed threatened or protected 
species. It followed, therefore, that when the Minister decided to prohibit the canned hunting 
of lions in Regulation 24(1) he must have been satisfied that this activity was a threat to the 
survival of the species.146  
 
An important consequence of this decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out further, 
is that when the Minister decided that the canned hunting of lions would be prohibited only for 
a period of 24 months in terms of Regulation 24(2), he must have also been satisfied that at the 
expiry of this period the canned hunting of lions no longer posed a threat to the survival of the 
species and that only if he was so satisfied could his decision to make Regulation 24(2) be 
rational.147 
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“Regulation 24 requires to be read as a whole. Subreg (1) proclaims a series of prohibited activities including the 
hunting of listed large predators which are ‘put and take’ animals. Subreg (2) uplifts the prohibition created in reg 
24(1)(a) under specified circumstances. What legislative purpose does the prohibition on the hunting of ‘put and 
take’ lions serve? The two principal purposes of the Act are the management and conservation of South Africa’s 
biodiversity and the protection of species and ecosystems. More specifically, s 57(2) of the Act, in empowering 
the Minister to prohibit the carrying out of any activity involving a listed threatened or protected species provides 
that he or she may only do so if that activity ‘is of a nature that may negatively impact on the survival’ of that 
species. The specific condition for the exercise of a prohibiting power is thus one which serves for the protection 
of that species. Although s 57(2) contemplates publication of a prohibitory notice on an ad hoc basis in the Gazette, 
it is clear that in so far as the Minister chooses to include an equivalent prohibition in regulations made under his 
powers under s 97(b) of the Act the exercise of his power must be read as subject to s 57(2)(a) since it is s 57 
which creates the bar on carrying out restricted activities and empowers the Minister to licence them. One may 
therefore accept that the Minister in making reg 24(1)(a) considered that the hunting of put and take lions with or 
without a permit constituted a threat to the survival of the lion as a species. Where a power to impose a prohibition 
can only be exercised if it will achieve or tend to a particular result – as is the case with s 57(2)(a) – and the 
functionary decides to terminate the prohibition such a decision will be irrational unless he or she first considers 
whether the reason for the prohibition has ceased to apply. It follows that, in arriving at his decision to include 
provision for the uplifting of the prohibition the Minister should have considered whether there was evidence 
available that, if the prohibition were to be lifted, the potential negative impact on the survival of the species 
would not persist. Only if he was so satisfied could he rationally have made s 24(2)”.148 
 
The Minister, however, did not state that this was the reason for making Regulation 24(2). 
Instead, he stated that the reason for making Regulation 24(2) was to ensure that captive bred 
lions could become in fact self-sustaining and the reason why he wanted to ensure that captive-
bred lions could become self-sustaining was to address the criticisms that had been levelled 
against the canned hunting of lions and to promote a more ethical form of hunting, one which 
included a “fair chase”.149 
 
The problem with these justifications, the Supreme Court of Appeal, went on to point out, was: 
 
 First, that a careful examination of the scientific evidence showed there was no 
scientific basis for the belief that a captive-bred lion could become self-sufficient within 
24 months or within any period at all. Given this fact, the prohibition on the canned 
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hunting of lions could never be lifted in practice and Regulation 24(2), therefore, was 
meaningless.150  
 
 Second, that the desire to promote ethical hunting and the principle of a fair chase with 
respect to captive-bred lions that were never intended to be released into the wild did 
not fit into the legislative scheme of the Biodiversity Act which was designed to 
promote and conserve biodiversity in the wild.151 
 
 Third, although the Minister claimed to have based his decision on the 
recommendations of a panel of experts he had appointed to assist him, a careful 
examination of the panel’s recommendations showed that he had distorted and 
misrepresented the panel’s views. The panel had never referred to a period of 24 
months. Instead, the panel had simply stated that hunting should be permitted once the 
animal became self-sustaining in the wild, without specifying any period at all.152 
 
In light of these problems, the Supreme Court of Appeal went on to conclude, the Ministers 
reasons for making Regulation 24(2): 
  
“(i)  do not rationally conduce to the objectives of the Act;  
(ii)  given his intention that hunting should not be the subject of a total prohibition, tend to   the opposite 
effect;  
(iii)  cannot be justified according to the facts and opinions available to him”.153 
 
(d) Comment 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in this case narrowed the difference between 
the minimalist constitutional test for rationality (which the Court purported to apply) and the 
enhanced administrative test for rationality (a) by subjecting the scientific evidence on which 
the Minister based his decision to a searching and thorough examination; and (b) by finding 
that the Minister’s decision was not rationally connected to the information provided to him by 
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the panel of experts. In other words, the Court essentially applied the test for rationality set out 
in section 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc) of the PAJA, namely that an administrative act may be reviewed and 





Although it is not entirely clear which elements are encompassed by the test for reasonableness, 
Hoexter argues that it must include more than just rationality. This is partly because rationality 
and reasonableness are listed as separate grounds of review in PAJA. Rationality is listed as 
ground of review in section 6(2)(f)(jj) and reasonableness as a ground of review in section 
6(2)(h). It follows, therefore, that they cannot mean the same thing.154 
 
Apart from rationality, Hoexter argues that reasonableness also includes proportionality (or at 
least some elements of proportionality), although this is controversial.155 The concept of 
proportionality is derived from German law and its purpose is to “avoid an imbalance between 
the adverse and beneficial effects . . . of an action and to encourage the administrator to consider 
both the needs for the action and the possible use of less drastic or oppressive means to 
accomplish the desired end”.156 Among its essential elements, therefore, are balance, necessity 
and suitability.157 
 
When it comes to determine whether a decision is reasonable a variety of factors have to be 
taken into account. These factors, which were identified by the Constitutional Court in its 
judgment in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,158 
are as follows: 
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“the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the 
decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing interests involved and the impact of the 
decision on the lives and well-being of those affected”. 159 
 
In the same way that the courts appear to have narrowed the differences between the 
administrative test for rationality and the minimalist version of the constitutional test for 
rationality, they also appear to have narrowed the differences between the test for 
reasonableness and the minimalist test for rationality. This is most clearly illustrated in the 
Constitutional Court’s judgments in Zealand v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development160 and Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA.161 
 
3.2 Zealand v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development  
 
(a) The facts  
The facts of the case were as follows: On 24 January 1997 the applicant was charged in the 
regional court, together with at least two other co-accused with murder, rape and assault with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm (the first case). That case was postponed several times, with 
the applicant being remanded in custody. On 15 May 1997 the applicant escaped from custody 
and was re-arrested and put back into custody on 6 August 1997.162 
 
On 20 April 1998 the applicant was convicted of escaping from custody and sentenced to 
imprisonment for six months, wholly suspended. On 28 September 1998, while still awaiting 
trial on the first case he was convicted in the Port Elizabeth High Court of the murder of Melvin 
Phillips and of the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, crimes allegedly 
committed after the applicant's escape from custody but before his re-arrest (the second case). 
He was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 years for these offences and was imprisoned in the 
maximum security block at St Albans Prison.163  
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He was granted leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence in the second case to the 
full court of the Grahamstown High Court. His appeal was successful, with the result that his 
conviction and sentence in the second case were set aside on 23 August 1999. The registrar of 
that High Court, however, negligently failed to issue a warrant for the applicant's release, or 
otherwise to inform St Albans Prison of the successful appeal until 8 December 2004. The 
applicant was eventually released only on 9 December 2004 which was more than five years 
after his successful appeal against his conviction and sentence in the second case.164 
 
The registrar's negligence was admitted by the respondents. Mrs Adendorff, the acting head of 
the maximum security section of St Albans Prison testified before the High Court that, had the 
registrar properly issued the release warrant after the applicant's successful appeal on 23 August 
1999, he would immediately have been transferred to the medium security, the awaiting-trial 
section of the prison. That did not occur. Instead, notwithstanding his successful appeal, the 
applicant remained in detention in the maximum security block, an area which, as Mrs 
Adendorff explained housed only convicted and sentenced prisoners until his release on 9 
December 2004.165 
 
In addition between 23 August 1999 and the applicant's release, the first case was repeatedly 
postponed in the regional court, until the charges were finally withdrawn on 1 July 2004. The 
record of appearances and remands in the first case shows that in respect of the overall majority 
of the postponements after he was sentenced in the second case on 28 September 1998 
(including those after his successful appeal), the clerk of the regional court was directed by the 
St Albans Prison authorities, by way of the appropriate forms, that the applicant was not to be 
released because he was a sentenced prisoner. On most occasions, the presiding magistrates 
who ordered the postponements remanded the applicant in custody at St Albans Prison by way 
of warrants for detention. Notably, and again despite the applicant's successful appeal in the 
second case during August 1999, it was subsequently recorded on at least five occasions that 
he was to be held in custody because of the 18-year sentence of imprisonment imposed upon 
him on 28 September 1998.166 
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Finally the record in the first case also reveals that on 11 October 2001 an order was made by 
magistrate that the case be postponed and that the applicant be released on warning. In addition, 
the relevant form contains the inscription that the applicant was to be released on warning. A 
warrant of detention which is normally issued by a presiding officer following a remand in 
custody, was not issued. However, for reasons that are not apparent on the record, the applicant 
was not released. Instead, he was returned to the maximum security section of St Albans Prison 
and, at his very next appearance on 29 October 2001, a different magistrate again remanded 
him in custody.167 
 
(b) The issue(s) 
The fundamental issue that had to be established by the Constitutional Court on appeal were 
whether or not the applicant's detention between 23 August 1999 and 30 June 2004 as a 
sentenced prisoner in the maximum security section of St Albans Prison was unlawful for the 
purpose of delictual damages. This could be framed differently as: is it lawful to detain a person 
as if he or she were a convicted prisoner in circumstances where (i) the ostensible basis for his 
or her detention is absent especially where a court of law has upheld his or her appeal against 
conviction and sentence, but (ii) he or she is awaiting trial on other charges in relation to a 
separate offence in respect of which he or she has not been convicted or sentenced?168 
 
(c) The judgment 
After a careful examination, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant should succeed 
primarily because his s12(1)(a) 169 of the constitution as well as the founding value of 
freedom170 rights had been infringed.171 Accordingly, it was held to be sufficient in this case 
for the applicant simply to plead that he was unlawfully detained. This he did. The respondents 
then bore the burden to justify the deprivation of liberty, whatever form it may have taken. It 
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found that the only reason to detain him was so secure his court attendance, which could not 
justify keeping him in a maximum security as a convicted prisoner.172 
 
“In my view in detaining the applicant as a sentenced prisoner in maximum security, the State failed to comply 
with the substantive component of the s 12(1)(a) right, for the following reasons. Following his successful appeal 
in the second case, the applicant was treated as a sentenced prisoner when he was not in fact sentenced, and was 
remanded into maximum security when he had no conviction of any serious criminal wrongdoing. The only 
possible legal basis on which to justify any deprivation of the applicant's freedom at all was the fact that he was 
still awaiting trial in the first case. That, however, was insufficient to justify treating him as if he were convicted 
and sentenced…”173 
 
The Court then seemed to have adopted a proportionality standard to find that this infringement 
on his liberty was undoubtedly greater than was necessary to secure the applicant's attendance 
at trial. It further reasoned that other prisoners who were awaiting their trials in detention at St 
Albans Prison were not subjected to the same treatment. It follows that the deprivation of 
freedom inflicted upon the applicant was undoubtedly 'without just cause' in terms of s 12(1)(a) 
of the Constitution. Furthermore, the fact that the deprivation was in no way rationally 
connected to an objectively determinable purpose must mean that it was also 'arbitrary' within 
the meaning of that provision.174  
 
The Constitutional Court found that the reasoning and interpretation of this right (s12(1)(a) of 
the Constitution) should include the substantive protection afforded by the right not to be 
deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause. It further found that right requires not 
only that every encroachment on physical freedom be carried out in a procedurally fair manner, 
but also that it be substantively justified by acceptable reasons. The mere fact that a series of 
magistrates issued orders remanding the applicant in detention is not sufficient to establish that 
the detention was not 'arbitrary or without just cause'. The Court still maintained that the 
decision not release the applicant was irrational.175 
 
The Constitutional Court then drew three grounds upon which it believed and concluded that 
the principle of legality had been violated: First, the effect of Prison authorities conduct was to 
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bring about an illegal state of affairs, namely, the detention of the applicant as a sentenced 
prisoner in a maximum security facility contrary to his constitutional right to freedom and 
security of the person in terms of s 12(1)(a) of the Constitution. Second, the orders were 
irrational and therefore arbitrary, in the sense that the power to grant them was not exercised 
in a manner that was rationally related to the purpose for which that power was given. The 
purpose of the power to remand an awaiting-trial prisoner in custody is to ensure his or her 
attendance at trial; detaining the applicant as a sentenced prisoner was unnecessary for that 
purpose. Third, the orders were also issued in breach of s168 and s276  of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.176 With this, the Court therefore concluded that this detention amounted to a 
form of punishment, which was wrong.177. 
 
The Court finally held that the inevitable conclusion is that the applicant was unjustifiably 
detained in a manner that violated his right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily and without 
just cause. Further, that violation cannot be justified under s 36 of the Constitution because it 
was not 'in terms of law of general application'. It follows that the applicant's detention from 
23 August 1999 until 30 June 2004 was indeed unlawful.178 
 
(d) Comment 
While it cannot be disputed that detaining the applicant would still serve the purpose of 
imprisoning someone in a general sense (that of securing a court attendance) which would then 
make applicant’s detention a rational decision given the objective; the Court in this case seem 
to have used the proportionality standard to find in the applicant’s favour. In other words it can 
be argued that the means used of keeping the accused in a maximum security section as a 
convicted prisoner while he was merely awaiting a trial would still and surely meet the intended 
objective which is to secure his courts attendance. However this was held to be a 
disproportionate measure given the objective. When this is done, it then blurs the distinction 
between the rationality and the reasonableness standards as they then seem to require a similar 
factor; that of proportionality. 
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3.3 Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 
 
(a) The facts  
In this case the facts were as follows: On or about Wednesday 25 November 2009 the President 
of the Republic of South Africa purportedly in terms of s 179of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa (the Constitution)179, read with s9 and s10 of the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act180 to appoint Mr Menzi Simelane as the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(the appointment). This appointment was challenged on various constitutional grounds inter 
alia that Mr Menzi Simelane was not a fit and proper person with sufficient conscientiousness 
and integrity to be entrusted with the responsibilities of this office as required by the 
constitution.181 
 
The factual background of the case broadly summarised was that 
 
“Mr Simelane, in his capacity as the Director-General of the Department for Justice and Constitutional 
Development (Director-General) was intimately involved in a dispute concerning the proper role of the then 
National Director, Mr Vusi Pikoli. The dispute related to the powers and duties of the Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development and the National Director where Mr Pikoli was suspended by the then President 
Thabo Mbeki. He (Mr Mbeki) appointed a commission of enquiry headed by a former Speaker of Parliament, Dr 
Frene Ginwala (Ginwala Commission) to inquire into Mr Pikoli’s fitness to hold office as the National Director. 
Mr Simelane presented the government’s submissions and gave evidence under oath before the Ginwala 
Commission where the credibility of his evidence was criticised. His conduct was then investigated by the Public 
Service Commission of which in a detailed report, recommended disciplinary proceedings against Mr Simelane 
arising out of his conduct and evidence before the Ginwala Commission. However the President chose to ignore 
these recommendations and appointed Mr Simelane as the National Director of Public Prosecutions.”182 
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of the national executive; and (b) Directors of Public Prosecutions and prosecutors as determined by an Act of 
Parliament”.   
180 Act 32 of 1998. The sections read as follows: Section 9 (1): “Any person to be appointed as National 
Director, Deputy National Director or Director must (a) possess legal qualifications that would entitle him or her 
to practise in all courts in the Republic; and (b) be a fit and proper person, with due regard to his or her 
experience, conscientiousness and integrity, to be entrusted with the responsibilities of the office concerned. S10 
The President must, in accordance with section 179 of the Constitution, appoint the National Director. 
181 Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) at para 12. 




The Democratic Alliance contended that the President inter alia ought to have considered the 
relevant parts of the transcript of proceedings, reports and the recommendations by the Public 
Service Commission which spoke to Mr Simelane’s fitness for office; in this they contended 
that the President failed to make a proper objective assessment of Mr Simelane’s fitness for 
office. They further contended that the President insisted on appointing Mr Simelane as 
someone through which he could ‘tame and control’ the NPA. Thus, the appointment was made 
for an ulterior purpose.183 
  
(b) The issue(s) 
The issues that arose therefore were inter alia: whether the process as well as the ultimate 
decision must be rational; the consequences for rationality if relevant factors are ignored.  
 
(c) The judgment 
The Constitutional Court dismissed the application and held that the right to a fair procedure is 
not a self-standing component of the principle of legality. In arriving at this decision, the Court 
held that both the process by which the decision is made and the decision itself must be 
rational.184 To reiterate this point the Court carefully observed Albutt’s case and held that: 
 
“It is true that the decision by the President in this case was made as head of the National Executive. It is illogical 
to suggest that while decisions by the President as Head of State must be rational in process and outcome, decisions 
of the President as head of the National Executive should be rational only in outcome and not in so far as they 
relate to the process.” 185  
 
This means it did not matter in what capacity the President was acting, the process by which 
the decision was made must also be rational like the decision itself. The Court went on to reason 
that not only the decision taken must be rational but everything done in the process of taking 
that decision becomes part of the means and so must be rational as well. 
 
“The conclusion that the process must also be rational in that it must be rationally related to the achievement of 
the purpose for which the power is conferred, is inescapable and an inevitable consequence of the understanding 
that rationality review is an evaluation of the relationship between means and ends. The means for achieving the 
purpose for which the power was conferred must include everything that is done to achieve the purpose. Not only 
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the decision employed to achieve the purpose, but also everything done in the process of taking that decision, 
constitute means towards the attainment of the purpose for which the power was conferred.”186 
 
This means if any step in the process of a decision (as the Court reasoned) bears no rational 
link to the objective of the empowering provision, the entire decision will successfully be 
reviewed for irrationality. However the absence of this process-related link to the objective that 
is sought to be achieved must be of such a kind that it taints the entire process with 
irrationality.187 In addition, the steps taken to arrive at a particular decision have significant 
effects on the decision itself and are therefore crucial in the objective sought to be achieved; 
they therefore can never be separated from the decision. 
 
In the context of the case, the Constitutional Court went on to hold that the President’s failure 
to take into account extracts from the report of the Ginwala Commission which ought to have 
been considered by any person involved in the process of Mr Simelane’s appointment to the 
position of National Director of Public Prosecutions was not be rationally related to the purpose 
of the power, that is, to appoint a fit and proper person.188 
 
The Court further went to set up a three-stage test to declare that this decision was irrational 
which are: “firstly whether the factors ignored are relevant; the second requires the 
consideration of whether the failure to consider the material concerned (the means) is rationally 
related to the purpose for which the power was conferred; and the third, which arises only if 
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187 Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) at para 37 “This conclusion addresses the 
differences that emerged in argument on whether the decision needs to be rational or whether the process 
resulting in the decision should also have been rational for an executive decision to stand. A related question, if 
the process is to be rationally related to the purpose for which the power has been conferred, is whether each 
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every step in the process resulting in the decision need not be rationally viewed in isolation, the rationality of the 
steps taken have implications for whether the ultimate executive decision is rational. In my view, the decision of 
the President as Head of the National Executive can be successfully challenged only if a step in the process 
bears no rational relation to the purpose for which the power is conferred and the absence of this connection 
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appointment to the position of National Director. Any failure to take into account these comments, or any 
decision to ignore them and to proceed with Mr Simelane’s appointment without more, would not be rationally 





the answer to the second stage of the enquiry is negative, is whether ignoring relevant facts is 
of a kind that colours the entire process with irrationality and thus renders the final decision 
irrational.”189 
 
After a closer evaluation and application of these three stages, the Court went on to hold that 
there may be very few (if any) circumstances where the factors ignored may be relevant to the 
objective but ignoring them would not render the entire decision irrational in the sense that the 
means might nevertheless bear a rational link to the end that is sought to be achieved.190 It 
therefore came to the conclusion that the President’s decision to ignore these factors was of a 
kind that coloured the entire process irrational, and thus rendered the ultimate decision 
irrational.191 And that there is no rational relationship between ignoring the findings of the 
Ginwala Commission without more and the purpose for which the power had been given.192 
Therefore the decision to ignore these factors was an irrational one and had to be set aside.193 
 
(d) Comment 
From this judgment the concern that arises is that it seems that the information before the 
administrator, the range of factors and the options available to the President among others 
mattered in as far as the rationality principle is concerned. These are the factors that are known 
                                                          
189 Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) at para 39 “It follows that this principle 
would not directly govern the President’s power to appoint the National Director either. That is not to say that 
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to form part of the reasonableness standard under PAJA as such this further blurs the difference 
between the two standards.194 One would therefore question whether these factors should also 
form the basis for an executive decision to be reviewable, thus be declared irrational. 
 
4. Critical reaction 
The expanded and enhanced test for rationality has been criticised by academic commentators. 
Apart from denouncing the expanded and enhanced test for rationality on the grounds that it 
subverts the PAJA, academic commentators have also criticised the expanded and enhanced 
rationality test on the grounds that it infringes the doctrine of the separation of powers.  
 
Kohn, for example, argues that the courts are using the expanded and enhanced rationality test 
to increase their reservoir of judicial power and expand their supervisory review jurisdiction in 
a manner that is inconsistent with the principle of the separation of powers doctrine. Given the 
attacks that have been levelled against the courts for being counter-majoritarian, she argues 
further, the expanded and enhanced test for rationality may lead to “gradual chipping away of 
our court’s fiercely guarded institutional security and thus the ‘authoritative legitimacy’ that 
lies at the heart of their power”.195 
 
Unlike the expanded and enhanced test for rationality, Kohn goes on to argue that 
“the minimalist version of the test for rationality does not offend the separation of powers. This is because the 
minimalist test focuses on the structure of the decision-making process rather than the decision itself. It requires 
an assessment, first, of whether the conduct or decision in question furthers a legitimate government purpose, and, 
second, of whether the means chosen to achieve this purpose are objectively capable of furthering it based upon 
the information before the administrator and any reasons given for the decision.”196  
 
In addition, she argues, the test does not require an assessment of the correctness of the decision 
itself, nor an analysis of whether the means chosen serve the purpose “sufficiently well”. 
Instead, it requires solely that the decision was made pursuant to a constitutionally legitimate 
“rhyme or reason”. This is different from reasonableness which requires a stricter compliance 
                                                          
194 Promotion of Access to Justice Act. 3 of 2000. Section 6(2) (h) of the Act reads as follows: “The exercise of 
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in relation to administrative actions. This standard essentially requires that it be shown that the 
means chosen were the most appropriate, or “suitable”, in the circumstances.197 
 
Finally, Kohn argues that while the expanded and enhanced test for rationality has some 
benefits, it also gives rise to problems, or in her own words, it “is not free from potholes. It is 
not the yellow brick road”. This test, she argues further, results in uncertainty for “lay persons 
and civil servants alike. Far from being a simply pathway to review, it creates its own form of 
complexity. The most significant of these is that it runs the risk of becoming too broad. Given 
this danger, she goes on to conclude, it is very important that when the courts apply this 
expanded and enhanced test for rationality that they engage with the requirements of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers.198 
  
5. Conclusion 
As it by should now be a settled argument given the above chapter three and the above 
discussions that our legal jurisprudence seem to lean too much towards the principle of 
rationality as more than just a “mere simple means-ends” test but to incorporate some aspects 
of reasonableness; PAJA requirements; procedural fairness and reasons-giving inter alia, what 
follows then is a careful observation of what effect this expanded notion of rationality has on 
the principle of the separation of powers. More than just exploring this effect, the following 
chapter will seek to focus on what and how the substantive theory of the principle can be used 
to justify this inference by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court on the 
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 CHAPTER FIVE: THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss a substantive theory of the doctrine of 
the separation of powers. This substantive theory of the separation of powers will then be 
employed to evaluate the validity of the criticisms that have been levelled against the manner 
in which the courts have expanded and enhanced the test for rationality. Before considering a 
substantive theory of the separation of powers, however, the origins, purpose and elements of 
the separation of powers will be considered. The separation of powers concerns that the 
power of judicial review gives rise to will also be examined. 
 
2. The origin of the doctrine of the separation of powers 
While the origin of the doctrine of the separation of powers is sometimes traced back to the 
English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), who argued that the power of the state should 
be divided into legislative, executive and foreign relations functions,199 the more modern 
version is usually traced back to the French political philosopher Baron de Montesquieu 
(1689-1755) who discussed it in his book The Spirit of the Laws (1748).200  
 
In this book Montesquieu argued that in order to prevent the abuse of power and thus to 
enhance the freedom of the individual it was important to decentralise the power of the state 
by dividing it into three distinct categories, namely legislative power, executive power and 
judicial power and then to vest each of these categories of power in separate branches of the 
state, namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.201 He state in this respect that: 
 
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, 
there can be no liberty; because many apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact 
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
 
Again, there is no liberty, if the judicial power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it 
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge 
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(1902). 




would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and 
oppression”.202 
 
Montesquieu’s argument in favour of decentralising power by dividing into legislative, 
executive and judicial categories was supported by James Madison, who helped draft the 
United States Constitution. In the Federalist Papers, Madison agreed that “the accumulation 
of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few or 
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny”.203 
 
3. The purpose of the doctrine of the separation of powers 
Apart from enhancing the freedom of the individual by preventing the abuse of power, in 
most democracies, including South Africa, the doctrine of the separation of powers also has a 
number of other goals. Perhaps the most important of these is that it creates a division of 
labour. In this way it promotes the efficiency and expertise of the different branches of 
government. Each branch can concentrate on and develop its ability to implement its own 
unique functions, without being distracted by the burden of having to implement the 
functions of the other branches of government. 
 
4. The elements of the separation of powers 
Since Montesquieu first introduced the separation of powers, the doctrine has evolved and 
“today it is usually divided into four principles, namely: the principle of trias politica; the 
principle of the separation of functions; the principle of the separation of personnel; and the 
principle of checks and balances.”204  
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The principle of trias politica provides that the power of the state should be divided into 
legislative, executive and judicial power and then allocated to three separate branches of the 
state, namely: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.205  
 
The principle of the separation of functions provides that each of the three branches of the 
state may exercise only those powers and functions that have been conferred upon it and may 
not exercise any of the powers that have been conferred on the other two branches.206 
 
Somewhat similarly, the principle of the separation of personnel provides that each of the 
three branches of the state must be composed of separate and distinct groups people and that 
a person who is a member of one branch may not simultaneously be a member of another 
branch.207 
 
Finally, the principle of checks and balances provides that each branch must act as check on 
the others in order to maintain a balance of power. In order to achieve this goal, however, the 
principle of checks and balances accepts that each branch will inevitably have to intrude upon 
the terrain of the others. It thus undermines the strict separation envisaged by the first three 
principles.208 
 
The strict approach suggested by the first three principles is sometimes also referred to as the 
formalist approach, while the less strict approach suggested by the principle of checks and 
balances is sometimes also referred to as the functionalist approach. 
 
The formalist approach is based on the idea that the functions and the personnel of each of 
the three branches of the state can be distinguished from one another and must be kept strictly 
                                                          
205 J D van der Vyver ‘The Separation of powers’ 1993 SAPL 177 at 178. See also M J Ville Constitutionalism 
and separation of powers 2nd ed (1967) 13 and P Labuschagne ‘The doctrine of the separation of powers and its 
application in South Africa’ (2004) 23(3) Poleitia 84 at 86. 
206 J D van der Vyver ‘The Separation of powers’ 1993 SAPL 177 at 178. See also M J Ville Constitutionalism 
and separation of powers 2nd ed (1967) 13 and P Labuschagne ‘The doctrine of the separation of powers and its 
application in South Africa’ (2004) 23(3) Poleitia 84 at 86. 
207 J D van der Vyver ‘The Separation of powers’ 1993 SAPL 177 at 178. See also M J Ville Constitutionalism 
and separation of powers 2nd ed (1967) 13 and P Labuschagne ‘The doctrine of the separation of powers and its 
application in South Africa’ (2004) 23(3) Poleitia 84 at 86. 
208 J D van der Vyver ‘The Separation of powers’ 1993 SAPL 177 at 178. See also M J Ville Constitutionalism 
and separation of powers 2nd ed (1967) 13 and P Labuschagne ‘The doctrine of the separation of powers and its 




separate. In terms of this approach each branch of the state must focus exclusively on its own 
functions and must not interfere in the functions of the other branches.209 
 
The functionalist approach is based on the idea that the functions and personnel of each of the 
three branches of the state cannot always be easily distinguished from one another and, more 
importantly, nor should they always be. Instead, this approach argues that each branch is 
entitled to intrude into the terrain of the others in order to hold them accountable and thus 
promote a balance of power. This approach thus acknowledges that it is not always possible 
to divide state power into separate packages and seeks to ensure that no single branch 
assumes too much power.210 
 
Out of these two approaches, the functionalist approach is much more common. In fact, there 
is no modern state which has adopted a pure version of the formalist approach. As Carolan 
points out, this is because it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a state to function 
effectively if each branch was prohibited or restricted from interacting with the others.211 In 
addition, he points out further, this approach is based on the assumption that it is always 
possible to clearly distinguish legislative, executive and judicial functions from one another. 
While this may be true at a general level, it is not true at a practical level. At a practical level 
the distinction is so indeterminate, he concludes, that it renders the entire formalist approach 
impractical.212 Like most other countries, South Africa has adopted a functionalist approach 
to the separation of powers. 
 
5. The doctrine of the separation of powers in South Africa 
During the negotiations for a new democratic South Africa in the early 1990s,213 the 
negotiators agreed that the final constitution had to be based, inter alia, on a separation of 
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powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. This agreement was included 
in the interim Constitution214 as Constitutional Principle VI. This principle provided that: 
 
“There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, with appropriate 
checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.”215 
 
Although neither the interim Constitution nor the Constitution216 expressly refers to the 
separation of powers, there is no doubt that this doctrine does form a part of the system of 
government envisaged by the Constitution. This is primarily because the Constitution 
distinguishes between legislative, executive and judicial power and allocates these powers to 
different and separate organs of state.217  
 
Legislative power is conferred on Parliament at a national level, 218 the provincial legislatures 
at a provincial level219 and the municipal councils at a local level.220 Executive power is 
conferred on the President and the National Executive at a national level,221 the Premiers and 
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the Executive Councils at a provincial level222 and the municipal councils at a local level.223 
Finally, judicial power is conferred on the courts and judicial officers.224  
 
Given these provisions, it is not surprising that the Constitutional Court has confirmed that 
the doctrine of the separation of powers does form a part of South Africa’s system of 
government.225  
 
In SA Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath,226 for example, the Constitutional 
Court held that the existence of the doctrine of the separation of powers in South Africa may 
be derived from the wording and the structure of the Constitution: 
 
“In the first certification judgment this Court held that the provisions of our Constitution are structured in a way 
that makes provision for a separation of powers. In the Western Cape case227 it enforced that separation by 
setting aside a proclamation of the President on the grounds that the provision of the Local Government 
Transition Act228, under which the President had acted in promulgating the Proclamation, was inconsistent with 
the separation of powers required by the Constitution, and accordingly invalid. It has also commented on the 
constitutional separation of powers in other decisions. There can be no doubt that our Constitution provides for 
such a separation, and that laws inconsistent with what the Constitution requires in this regard, are invalid.”229 
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And, in Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the RSA,230 the Court reaffirmed that 
the existence of the doctrine of the separation of powers may be derived from the structure of 
the Constitution: 
 
‘The principle of the separation of powers emanates from the wording and structure of the Constitution. The 
Constitution delineates between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. This Court recognised a 
fundamental principle of the new constitutional text as being “a separation of powers between the Legislature, 
Executive and Judiciary with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.”231 
 
6. The functionalist approach in South Africa 
Apart from finding that the doctrine of the separation of powers forms an implicit part of 
South Africa’s system of government, the Constitutional Court has also found that the 
separation of powers envisaged by the Constitution is not based on a formalist approach, but 
rather on a functionalist approach. In other words, the Court has found that the principle of 
checks and balances forms a part of the South African doctrine of the separation of powers.232  
 
In the First Certification Judgment,233 for example, the Constitutional Court held that:  
 
“There is, however, no universal model of separation of powers and, in democratic systems of government in 
which checks and balances result in the imposition of restraints by one branch of government upon another, 
there is no separation that is absolute.234  . . . The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises 
the functional independent of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of checks and balances 
focuses on the desirability of ensuring that the constitutional order, as a totality, prevents the branches of 
government from usurping power from one another. In this sense it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable 
intrusion of one branch on the terrain of another. No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of 
powers: the scheme is always one of partial separation.”235 
 
And in De Lange v Smuts NO,236 the Constitutional Court repeated these points and then went 
on to hold that: 
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“. . . over time our Courts will develop a distinctly South African model of separation of powers, one that fits the 
particular system of government provided for in the Constitution and that reflects a delicate balancing, informed 
both by South Africa’s history and its new dispensation, between the need, on the one hand, to control 
government by separating powers and enforcing checks and balances and, on the other, to avoid diffusing power 
so completely that the government is unable to take timely measures in the public interest.”237 
 
As we have already seen, and as these judgments confirm, an important consequence of the 
functionalist approach envisaged by the Constitution, and confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court, is that one branch of government will inevitably intrude on the terrain of the others 
and restrain the manner in which it carries out its functions. Although the necessary or 
unavoidable intrusion of one branch on the terrain of the others may take many different 
forms, one of the most important restraints is the power of judicial review.238 
 
In the South African principle of checks and balances, therefore, every exercise of power is 
justiciable. There is no immune principle that exists; all organs of state are subject to the rule 
of law.239 The Constitutional Court has the power to review legislative and executive action 
for consistency with the Constitution, in some instances as the final arbiter and in others as 
the exclusive arbiter.240  This in essence means the Constitutional Court has the final say as 
the final arbiter in all constitutional matters of the land. It does this in various ways including 
judicial reviews. 
 
7. The functional approach and the power of judicial review 
The power of judicial review is the most effective way in which the courts can act as a check 
on the abuse of power by the legislature and the executive. It allows the courts to test laws 
and conduct against the provisions of the Constitution and to declare them to be 
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unconstitutional and invalid if they conflict with the provisions of the Constitution and that 
conflict cannot be justified in an open and democratic society. 241 
 
“In order to function as an effective check on the abuse of power by the other branches of government, 
however, the courts have to be, and have to be seen to be, independent and staffed by impartial judges. Judicial 
independence, therefore, forms an important part of the principle of checks and balances, in particular, and of 
the doctrine of the separation of powers, in general.”242 
 
The independence of the judiciary and the power of judicial review is provided for in various 
sections of the Constitution. Among the most important of these is section 165(2) which 
provides that: 
 
“The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially 
and without fear, favour or prejudice”. 
 
In addition, section 165(3) goes on to provide that no person or organ of state may interfere 
with the functioning of the court and section 165(4) provides that: 
 
“Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure the 
independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts”. 
 
And, finally, section 172 of the Constitution provides that a court must declare any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution to be invalid. It provides that: 
 
“When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency”. 
 
As the Constitutional Court has pointed out, the goal of all of these provisions is to ensure 
that the judiciary can fulfil its role as the guardian of the constitutional system: 
 
“In our constitutional order the judiciary is an independent pillar of State, constitutionally mandated to exercise 
the judicial authority of the State fearlessly and impartially. Under the doctrine of separation of powers it stands 
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on an equal footing with the executive and the legislative pillars of State; but in terms of political, financial or 
military power it cannot hope to compete. It is in these terms by far the weakest of the three pillars; yet its 
manifest independence and authority are essential. Having no constituency, no purse and no sword, the Judiciary 
must rely on moral authority. Without such authority it cannot perform its vital function as the interpreter of the 
Constitution, the arbiter in disputes between organs of State and, ultimately, as the watchdog over the 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights even against the State.”243 
 
Although the power of judicial review is an important part of the principle of checks and 
balances and thus of the doctrine of the separation of powers, the manner in which this power 
is exercised may give rise to its own separation of powers concerns. This is because the 
courts may, at least in theory, use the power of judicial review to usurp the powers and 
functions of the legislature and the executive and thus undermine the democratic will of the 
majority of the people. This concern is sometimes referred to as the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty. 
 
8. Judicial review and the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
As Kohn has pointed out, the power of judicial review is said to be counter-majoritarian 
because it gives unelected and seemingly unaccountable judges the power to declare laws 
made by democratically elected legislatures and policies made by democratically elected 
executives invalid. When an unelected and unaccountable judge declares a law or policy to be 
unconstitutional and invalid, therefore, he or she does not act on behalf of the majority, but 
against it.244 
 
Although this criticism is based on “a particularly thin, and thus misguided notion of 
democracy”, one which is not consistent with the protection of both the sovereignty of the 
people and the fundamental rights of individuals,245 it has nevertheless been levelled against 
the South African courts, often by high-ranking public officials, in recent years.  
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President Zuma himself, for example, has stated that the power conferred upon the courts 
cannot be seen as superior to the powers the executive have received from the people through 
a popular mandate: 
 
“We respect the powers and role conferred by our Constitution on the legislature and the judiciary. At the same 
time, we expect the same from these very important institutions of our democratic dispensation. The executive 
must be allowed to conduct its administration and policy making work as freely as it possibly can. 
 
The powers conferred on the courts cannot be regarded as superior to the powers resulting from a mandate given 
by the people in a popular vote. We also reiterate that in order to provide support to the judiciary and free our 
courts to do their work, it would help if political disputes were resolved politically. We must not get a sense that 
there are those who wish to co-govern the country through the courts, when they have not won the popular vote 
during elections”.246 
 
Apart from President Zuma, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, the then Minister of Public Administration, 
has also argued that the ANC and other liberation parties made a fatal error at the Multi-Party 
Negotiation Process (MPNP) when they agreed that the Constitution should be supreme and 
that the courts should be given the power of judicial review. This was a fatal error because it 
transferred a substantial amount of power from the legislature and the executive to the 
judiciary and allowed apartheid forces to retain white domination under a black 
government.247 
 
9. The counter-majoritarian difficulty and judicial restraint 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The manner in which the Constitutional and other South African courts have responded to the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty is to follow a system of judicial restraint. In terms of this 
approach the Constitutional Court has held that when it exercises the power of judicial review 
it must respect the legitimate constitutional interests of the other branches of government and 
intrude as little as possible into the terrain of the legislature and executive while still 
protecting the fundamental rights of individuals.248  
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In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs,249 for example, the 
Constitutional Court held that while it should not rubberstamp an unreasonable decision 
simply because of the complexity of that decision and the identity of the decision maker, it 
should “give due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions made by those with special 
expertise and experience in the field”. 
 
“In treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a court is recognising the 
proper role of the executive within the Constitution.  In doing so a court should be careful not to attribute to 
itself superior wisdom in relation to matters entrusted to other branches of government.  A court should thus 
give due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions made by those with special expertise and experience in 
the field.”250  
 
And in National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance251 the Constitutional Court 
held that while the courts are mandated to ensure that “all branches of government act within 
the law”, they must “refrain from entering the exclusive terrain of the executive and 
legislative branches of government unless the intrusion is mandated by the Constitution 
itself”.252 
 
“Beyond the common law, separation of powers is an even more vital tenet of our constitutional democracy. 
This means that the Constitution requires courts to ensure that all branches of Government act within the law. 
However, courts in turn must refrain from entering the exclusive terrain of the Executive and the Legislative 
branches of Government unless the intrusion is mandated by the Constitution itself.”253 
 
As these judgments illustrate, the deferential approach adopted by the courts is based on two 
important considerations, namely “democratic principle” and “institutional competence”. 
 
9.2 Democratic principle 
This principle provides that the “duty of respect” which the courts owe to the decisions of the 
legislative and the executive branches of the state arises out of the fact that these branches 
have democratic legitimacy. These branches have democratic legitimacy because the 
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members of the legislature are directly elected by the people, while the members of the 
executive are indirectly elected. They, therefore, represent the people, or at least the majority 
of the people, and are accountable to them. Given these facts, the decisions of the legislative 
and executive branches should not easily be overturned by the courts.254 
 
9.3 Institutional competence 
This principle provides that the “duty of respect” which the courts owe to the decision of the 
legislative and executive branches of the state arises out of the fact that these branches are 
better placed to make certain kinds of decisions than the courts are. This is particularly true 
insofar as “polycentric decisions” are concerned. A polycentric decision is one which 
involves a subject that is not legal in nature, but which is political in nature. The courts are 
not as good at making these sorts of decision as the legislative and executive branches 
because they often lack the experience, the expertise and the resources that are required to 
make them.255 
 
10. Judicial restraint and a theory of the separation of powers 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Although the Constitutional Court has held that the courts must respect the decisions of the 
legislative and executive branches of government, it is important to note that it is the courts 
themselves who determine when and to what extent they should intervene in a decision taken 
by the legislative or executive branch of government. In other words, it is the courts 
themselves who decide where judicial review begins and where it ends. 
 
 This point was highlighted by the Constitutional Court in its judgment in Glennister v 
President of the RSA256 when it stated the following: 
 
“In our constitutional democracy, the courts are the ultimate guardians of the Constitution. They not only have 
the right to intervene in order to prevent the violation of the Constitution, they also have the duty to do so. It in 
the performance of this that the courts are more likely to confront the question of whether to venture into the 
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domain of the other branches of government and the extent of such intervention. But even in these 
circumstances, courts must observe the limits of their powers.”257 
 
As Davis has pointed out, however, the decision on when to intervene and then to what extent 
depends on a coherent and substantive theory of the doctrine of the separation of powers, in 
general, and of judicial review, in particular. Unfortunately, he goes on to point out, the 
Constitutional Court has largely failed to develop such a theory. There is, consequently, very 
little in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court that the other courts can rely on when 
they have to decide on the scope and ambit of the power of judicial review.258   
 
Although the Constitutional Court has failed to develop a coherent and substantive theory of 
the doctrine of the separation of powers, academic commentators such as Davis and Pretorius 
have attempted to do so. The theories suggested by each of these commentators will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
10.2 Davis 
In a comment published in the South African Law Journal in 2016, Davis argues that while 
there are a number of different principles on which a substantive theory of the separation of 
powers may be based, the most appropriate for South Africa is Fraser’s “principle of 
participatory parity”.259 This is because, he argues further, it is consistent with the “kind of 
active citizenship which is required for the [participatory] democracy envisaged by our 
Constitution”.260  
 
Insofar as the principle of participatory parity is concerned, Fraser argues that people are 
entitled to participate in society as peers or equals. In order to achieve this goal, however, she 
argues further, two substantive conditions must be satisfied.  
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The first, which may be referred to as an objective condition, focuses on the economic and 
social conditions in a society. It provides that every person is entitled to a minimum standard 
of life so that they can participate effectively in the political process.261 Systematic economic 
inequalities, therefore, must be eliminated. This does not mean “that everyone must have 
exactly the same income, but it does require the sort of rough equality that is inconsistent 
with systematically generated relations of dominance and subordination”. This condition is 
related to the politics of redistribution.262 
 
The second, which may be referred to as an inter-subjective condition, focuses on the culture, 
identity and status of individuals in a society. It provides that every person is entitled to be 
recognised no matter what their race, gender or sexual orientation is. Social relations that 
“deny some people that status of full partners in interactions – whether by burdening them 
with excessive ascribed ‘difference’ or by failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness” must 
be eliminated. While the first condition is related to the politics of redistribution, this 
condition is related to the politics of recognition to affirm the identity and equal recognition 
of groups.263 
 
The two substantive conditions identified by Fraser highlights a core feature of the South 
African Constitution, namely that a participatory democracy is incompatible with poverty or 
stark inequality. The active participation envisaged by South Africa’s system of democracy 
imposes an obligation on the state to provide each individual with the economic and social 
conditions he or she needs in order to able to participate in a manner that promotes his or her 
dignity, freedom, self-respect and self-rule.264 
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Like Davis, Pretorius265  has also proposed a substantive theory of the separation of powers. 
In an article published in Southern African Public Law in 2014, he argues that constitutional 
review must show a deliberative character, and that the interpretation and application of the 
Constitution together with the process of the constitutional review must reflect an adherence 
to the democratic and constitutional values which include inter alia openness, transparency 
and accountability.266 
 
“Given the fundamental importance of constitutional review and the fact of the indeterminacy of much of the 
constitutional essentials, this function itself must – in order to reflect the interdependence of democracy and 
constitutionalism – display a deliberative character. It would be hard otherwise to counter the accusation of 
paternalism or elitism often directed at the institution of constitutional review. The interpretation and application 
of the Constitution must be equally situated in a fully inclusive deliberative space. The process of constitutional 
review itself must be reflective of, and conducive to, the substantive democratic values of participation, 
inclusivity, openness, transparency, and public justification.”267 
 
This outlines the core requirement of public accountability which can summarily be referred 
to as the need for justification through publicly acceptable reasons268 which is also an 
important value of the constitution. In defining this Pretorius argues that in order to meet the 
higher demands of legitimacy required, the deliberative conception of democracy is organised 
around an idea of political justification, since it requires the finding of publicly acceptable 
reasons for collectively binding decisions.269 And that it is driven by the intuition that 
democratic legitimacy is closely linked to the ability and opportunity to participate in 
effective deliberation on the part of those subject to collective decisions, which “requires 
justification in terms and reflection that [people] are capable of accepting”.270  
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Therefore justification through deliberative engagement depends on both procedural 
(participatory) and substantive (‘public reason’) conditions, so the Constitution provides for 
the framework for public participation and accountability. 
 
“[C]onstitutionalism authoritatively defines and safeguards a democracy’s legitimating basis by entrenching a 
deliberative structure, which is defined by both inclusive participation and accountability in terms of a particular 
normative framework.”271 
 
Unlike Davis, Pretorius uses his substantive theory to critique the minimalist version of the 
test for rationality adopted by the Constitutional Court. In this respect he argues that the 
minimalist version has the potential to encourage a narrow version and understanding of the 
test for rationality, thereby jeopardising its legitimising value as a standard of constitutional 
review that requires justification for both governmental means and ends.272 In terms of the 
minimalist version the test for rationality runs the risk of degenerating into a matter of pure 
instrumental rationality.273  
 
This (instrumental) rationality standard, Pretorius argues further, is an ‘ill-suited” standard to 
regulate the exercise of public power.274 This is because it provides no basis to choose among 
different competing ends or to relate them in a meaningful way to an integrating normative 
perspective  which is what legal standards are supposed to be about if they are to claim any 
democratic justificatory and legitimising value.275 
 
“But instrumental rationality is ill-suited to serve as a normative constitutional standard to justify and legitimise 
the exercise of public power in order to resolve conflict and effect socio-political integration. Instrumental 
rationality as such provides no basis to choose among different competing ends or to relate them in a meaningful 
way to an integrating normative perspective – which is what legal standards are supposed to be about if they are 
to claim any democratic justificatory and legitimising value. As argued above, an instrumentalist understanding 
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of the rationality criterion tends to treat governmental purposes as givens and ends in themselves and therefore 
does not provide any external vantage point to reflect rationally on such ends.”276 
 
In addition, Pretorius goes on to argue, the minimalist test for rationality may also be 
criticised on the grounds that it creates a deliberative framework that is not inclusive enough 
to allow for the fair representation of all relevant perspectives and interests. This tendency to 
exclude and distort undermines the capacity of the minimalist test of rationality to facilitate 
discussion and contestation of the kind of normative reasons that can be legitimately invoked 
in the justification of the exercise of governmental power.277  
 
Apart from the criticisms set out above, Pretorius also argues that there is another compelling 
ground on which the minimalist version of the test for rationality may be criticised, namely 
that it is a deferential approach has often been applied to an already deferential standard. 
 
“Indeed, one of the problems with the current application of the test is that a deferential approach has often been 
applied to an already deferential standard…..since the government merely has to show a rational connection, not 
perfect rationality.”278 
 
What this means is that most focus of the lenient or minimum standard rationality is not often 
directed at testing whether the governmental objective is a legitimate one, but instead on the 
means used to achieve a purpose. Very least litigation (if any) has questioned the 
governmental objective, which raises the perception that it is often treated as a given or a 
free-standing frame of reference. When this is done, the deference has already been paid in 
relation to the legislative or executive decisions. 
 
“From a reading of the case law, it appears that the rationality analysis is often limited, for the purpose of 
establishing constitutional compliance, to an investigation of the utility of the means to serve particular ends. 
Although – at least theoretically – the standard also requires courts to investigate the legitimacy of governmental 
purposes, this aspect is often treated as a given and/or considered within a non-relational, free-standing frame of 
reference.”279 
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He argues that the courts should not let an already low-level standard drop below the floor by 
applying the test in a deferential manner. Rather since the test is inherently a low-level 
standard, it is incumbent for the court to demonstrate that it has scrutinised the government’s 
arguments closely. With regard to the argument that a deferential application is necessary in 
order to respect the doctrine of separation of powers, it is submitted that the doctrine is 
already respected implicitly by only requiring the government to meet a very low threshold 
(of merely establishing a rational connection).280 Thus, it is arguable that deference need not 
be applied in order to respect the doctrine. Instead, the court ought to take a robust approach 
when determining whether government has satisfied the low level required of it.281 
 
“The separation of powers has nothing to do with whether a decision is rational. In these circumstances, the 
principle of separation of powers is not of particular import in this case. Either the decision is rational or it is 
not.”282 
 
Moreover, it is further contended that the constitution provides that the courts have ‘a 
policing role to ensure that public power is exercised in accordance with the principle of 
legality’ and that ‘the courts are the final instruments to ensure the accountability of the 
exercise of public power’. Accordingly, if the courts do not adequately hold government to 
account when public power is exercised, then the courts are ultimately failing in their 
policing role.283  Thus; it would be hard to contemplate how the rationality standard could 
otherwise meaningfully play the role that the court indicated for it in Prinsloo284, namely to 
contribute to ‘a culture of justification’ by requiring an account of how ‘governmental action 
[is] relate[d] to a defensible vision of the public good’, as well as to ‘enhance the coherence 
and integrity of legislation’.285 
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The improved notion of the rationality principle has received some major criticisms from 
academic commentators like Kohn286 especially in that it threatens the principle of the 
separation of powers. Despite these criticisms that have been academics like Pretorius287 who 
have come up with some justifications of which inter alia include that rationality has a 
substantive aspect more than a formal approach. He further contends that a substantive aspect 
has a procedural requirement that would be required of any decision taken. And finally that 
courts have a policing role that they should or cannot fail. And Du Plessis and Scott288 are of 
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
1. Introduction 
It is incontrovertible from the above chapters that the study of rationality from a theoretical 
conception; definitions conferred to the principle at the inception; development of the 
principle and values that bolster it have created a measure misunderstanding in the legal 
fraternity. This ill-fated consequence has led to the uncertainty as to the correct legal position 
regarding the principle; beyond this it has received some criticism since the principle of 
legality in itself demands that law should be certain, ascertainable and predictable.  
 
Over and above, the prevailing confusion that emanates from this calamity is that the 
theoretical admonitions of the principle seem to be undermined by its very practice. This in 
simple terms suggest that the theoretic understanding of the principle seems to be at odds 
with its practical application; it seems as though our Courts are saying left but going right 
which should not be the case. However the interesting note is that whichever direction that 
one might want to follow, either a theoretical definition “minimum standard” or evidentially 
practical “rigorous standard” seem to attract some hurdles to overcome.  
 
This chapter therefore aims at posing some deep and insightful issues that come with variable 
standards of rationality and hurdles that ensue. It further wishes to expose some academic 
considerations and conflicts on the principle; reflect and comment on what seems to be the 
prevailing consideration; and most importantly make possible suggestions on the study as 
conclusions. 
 
2. Analysis of the study of a “dual” rationality and the schools of thought 
The above study has remarkably drawn some intuitive confirmations that rationality under 
legality has developed from a “minimum standard” to a “rigorous standard.” This was 
evidently drawn from how the principle has been defined against how it has been applied. 
This shift has been seen by others like Pretorius289 as a justifiable development given purpose 
of the rule of law of which includes inter alia that no one is above the law; that the 
democratic principles like accountability, openness and transparency must be observed. 
                                                          





According to him, minimum standard rationality does not reflect transparent basis of the 
decisions taken.  Therefore (as he holds) the duties conducted by the public functionaries or 
authority must inter alia follow the fair process, give reasons for the decisions taken and give 
a fair hearing to the affected victims.  
 
However this contention has been criticised by academics like Kohn290 who believe 
rationality should remain a simple test so that it remains in line with the separation of powers 
doctrine. Therefore to improve the test would threaten the principle of the separation of 
powers, which is certainly part of our legal system. Among other factors that she provides 
include that, it is not ideal to constrain the exercise of public power especially by politicians 
who have been given a popular mandate to govern according to the “will” of the people 
conferred in proper democratic processes. The courts are should not be allowed to be too 
intrusive as they are not better placed to deal with other matters. 
 
While on the one hand the rationality principle has been considered in a “minimum standard” 
form and ideally giving due respect to the principle of the separation of powers but seemingly 
failing to reflect the constitutional values which include inter alia openness, transparency and 
accountability. On the other hand, the principle has been considered in a “more exacting” 
form and ideally reflecting sufficiently on the constitutional values but criticised for 
undermining inter alia the democratic principle and institutional competence principles 
which hare core in the separation of power doctrine 
 
There is therefore another school of thought that is advanced and supported by the academics 
like Du Plessis and Scott.291 According to them, the rationality test review oscillates 
depending on what is being reviewed at a particular time.292 While they support the idea that 
the courts should not be too intrusive especially on the matters of the legislature and the 
executive but they concede to the fact that “this intensity of rationality review becomes most 
stark when analysing some Constitutional Court decisions.”293 Again this approach has been 
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criticised for failing to attach certainty in law which is the requirement of the very rule of law 
in that the rule of law demands that the “law to be accessible, precise, and the law of general 
application.”294 
 
3. Suggestions and conclusion 
Notwithstanding these critics that inevitably attach to each of the possible directions as 
evidently advanced by the academic commentators, there can be some positive conclusions 
that can also be drawn. In short, all these suggestions (democratic and constitutional 
principles to be foundational, deference to be paid to political decisions and rationality 
principle to be context-specific) are compelling and thus; worthy considering but the 
submission that can be made is that at the very least they can possibly be reconciled. 
 
Some insightful submissions in support of an improved rationality include that a minimum 
standard rationality (if it fails to question the legitimacy of the governmental objective and 
fails to observe the constitutional principles) fails the test before it is even applied. However 
an improved rationality can also be seen as a strategy for courts to justify their heightened 
level of intrusiveness in polycentric decisions of which they are not best positioned 
constitutionally to deal with. Another position is also important in that rationality standard 
should be context-specific and this should determine what standard will be relevant. It is 
submitted that these three contentions are reconcilable, and are not at odds with each other as 
they seem.  
 
What follows is a consideration when the test needs to be strict and when it needs to be 
lenient. This will then serve to account for a doubtful position over the past two decades of 
whether the test must remain simple or it must improve. The answer to this question lies in 
successfully analysing the institutional setting of the national executive and the legislature of 
the state. Some fundamental questions would include inter alia who forms each arm? Is it 
directly or indirectly accountable to the people? Within its construction or composition, what 
is the likelihood of collusive and thus; irrational decisions? Is there enough system of checks 
and balance in the composition of structure to avoid the abuse of power?  
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In as much as one can agree with Kohn in that the rationality standard must be a low 
standard, it is submitted that this approach can only be compelling in as far as the legislative 
decisions are concerned and not in executive decisions. The basis of this approach will be 
explored shortly below.  
 
I partly agree with Kohn in that the review of public power in relation to legislative actions, 
the standard must lenient for the following reasons. The Parliament is directly accountable to 
the people, they (people) vote directly for the political party, thus; it leads and delivers based 
on a popular mandate. The institutional setting of the Parliament or legislature comprises 
among others members of the leading political party (with most votes), opposition party’s 
members, and the decision-making process includes public participation.295 Therefore the 
decision goes under very tight inspection and therefore less-likely to be irrational. There is 
more than enough safe-guard in the process of the decision-making. There is less-likelihood 
of the abuse of power, and therefore the courts must pay a particular respect to the decisions 
taken by the constitutionally empowered personnel. In these particular type of decisions 
rationality must be kept a minimum standard. However where the decision is found to be 
irrational, the decision must be declared unlawful but most importantly sent back to the 
legislature for rectification. It is therefore submitted that the Poverty Alleviation judgment 
was a correct one. In this the separation of powers would have been respected. 
 
I disagree with Kohn in relation to the rationality standard for the executive decisions but 
instead agree with Pretorius in that the test has to be stricter for the following reasons. First, 
the executive arm of the government is indirectly accountable to the public, the public does 
not vote for the President but a majority political party appoints him. It is also the President 
who appoints his cabinet ministers. The institutional setting of the arm is only formed by the 
leading political party in the absence of the opposition parties and hence no opposition views. 
In addition there is no public participation process in the decision-making of this branch. In 
these decision formulations, there is less or no safe-guard at all. These decisions are highly-
likely to be biased and therefore irrational. There is a very high risk of the abuse of power in 
these decisions since there is no proper policing by other political parties. The courts would 
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therefore have to exercise their constitutional mandate to check for constitutional compliance 
like non-arbitrariness, values adhered to and abuse of power. The courts in these decisions 
therefore have to even check for the procedural aspects, reasons-giving among others. This is 
another way of saying the standard must be rigorous. It is therefore submitted that the Albutt, 
Motau, Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others296 inter 
alia were correctly decided which possibly calls for a repeal of the Masetlha297 case. 
 
In this particular instance it seems that Davis298 principles of participation and recognition are 
key to the determination of the standard of the review relevant to the test for rationality. What 
would be relevant would be whether or not the principle of participatory parity has been 
complied with. I therefore agree with this reasoning in that in the legislative processes, the 
public participation is already structurally effected to so the scope of review needs to be 
lenient and in executive decision, the public participation is ignored and so the review 
standard need to be stricter. 
 
When the above review standard is done, the compliance with the constitutional and 
democratic principles will be satisfied while the separation of powers principle will also be 
respected. In relation to legislative decisions the constitutional and democratic principles will 
be done by the political parties but in the executive decision, it will be done by the court 
itself. In this as well the principle of the rule of law will have been satisfied in the law will be 
static and have guidance.  
 
In summary when closely reviewing the South African legal jurisprudence especially using 
the Democratic Alliance and Merafong Municipality cases as examples among others, it 
seems as though our court are already reviewing more stringently in executive and less 
stringently in legislative actions without saying it. It is submitted that this seems to be the 
correct approach in our constitutional setting. 
 
I finally wish to attempt to respond to the counter-majoritarian debate that has been existing 
for the past 20 years. Besides that in the above submissions the problem seems to have been 
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addressed or settled, Sachs299 made some insightful arguments in relation to this. He contends 
that “the constitution does not envisage a mathematical form of democracy but rather a 
“pluralistic” democracy where continuous respect is given to the rights of all to be heard and 
have views considered.”300  What this essentially means is that in a democratic state where the 
constitution is supreme, the decisions must always be in line with the constitution. Therefore 
reducing majoritarian understanding to electoral results and therefore thinking that there is a 
popular mandate which suppresses the values of the constitution will be a shallow-minded 
understanding of the system. This refers to a system where even those who received the 
majority vote are still subjected to the constitution as “the supreme law of the land”301 and the 
rights and views of the minority group must be heard. 
 
In addition, Kohn argues that democracy is a dual standard in its construction, hence it is 
concerned with both the fair process and justifications of decisions, and mostly conflicting 
ends of the minority and the majority groups. 
 
“democracy has both a procedural and a substantive component in that it is concerned not only with the idea 
of popular sovereignty, but also with the protection of substantive rights. It is concerned not only with listening 
to the voice of the majority, but also with giving a voice to those in the minority and finally democracy is not 
the acquisition of authority by a few but the acquisition of the capacity by all to resist authority when it is 
abused.”302  
 
This means that democracy is about a collective decision making where all opposing views 
should be given equal consideration. I submit that in my view this is the correct way of 
looking at democracy in a constitutional democratic state and hence rationality has to be 
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